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This dissertation examined the character and social structure of team ownership groups in 
the National Football League (NFL) and how they shape the function of the NFL and/as a 
broader political economy. Drawing from bricolage as a form of research, the collective case 
study design (Stake, 2005) was employed to investigate the NFL and its ownership groups to 
better understand the political economy which shapes – and is shaped by – the NFL. Analyzing a 
variety of content from sources including the NFL, official team websites, news articles, legal 
cases, media interviews, online databases, and empirical social science, data were coded into 
themes and discussed in terms of NFL owners as a collective unit. As empowered through the 
structure of the NFL, ownership themes included the following: (a) overrepresentation of elite 
white men, (b) intergenerational transfer of wealth, (c) nepotism, (d) inter-institutional 
representation, (e) political and economic network, and (f) philanthropy. The interrelation of 
these themes points to the centrality of NFL ownership within a broader political and economic 
network that (re)produces the politics of elite-white-male dominance in the United States (see 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
LIBERATION STUDIES IN SPORT MANAGEMENT 
 The social and behavioral sciences can generally be characterized as having two 
axiomatic features that shape the epistemic structures of a variety of academic disciplines: (1) 
those which are substantially shaped by (white- and male-driven) market forces (see, for 
example, Newman, 2014), and (2) liberation studies (Feagin, Vera, & Ducey, 2015). In 
Liberation Sociology, the latter of these two features is defined “by its usefulness to those who 
are oppressed and struggling for their liberation” (Feagin, Vera, & Ducey, 2015, p. 2). The thrust 
of liberation sociology is to do more than research the social world; the point is to push the social 
world toward the expansion of human rights, participatory democracy, and social justice (Feagin, 
Vera, & Ducey, 2015). This dissertation is rooted in and draws inspiration from the rich legacy 
of liberation sociology for the explicit purpose of producing emancipatory knowledge in the field 
of sport management. 
Several sport management scholars have made arguments for critical and innovative 
approaches to studying sport and sport organizations that more directly accent the social impact 
of the sport industry (see Amis and Silk, 2005; Frisby, 2005; Knoppers, 2015; Shaw & Frisby, 
2006; Singer, 2005a; Slack and Parent, 2006; Zeigler, 2007). For example, Wendy Frisby (2005) 
positioned critical social science (CSS) perspectives as a useful tool for comprehensively 
assessing sport organizations, contending CSS “provides a provocative, politically, and morally 
illuminating way of examining the nature and consequences of various modes of human 




scholars have pointed to the social structure of sport in both research and practice. Singer 
(2005a) problematized the white racial structure of sport organizations and argued for critical 
race theory (CRT) as a “set of basic insights, perspectives, and methods that could help sport 
management scholars identify, analyze, and change those structural and cultural aspects of sport 
that maintain subordinate and dominant racial positions in and out of various sport 
organizations” (p. 471). Similarly, arguing for the utility of a poststructural feminist framework, 
Shaw and Frisby (2006) discussed how “policies to address structural barriers appear to be the 
vehicle of choice to promote gender equity for contemporary sport management researchers” (p. 
489). As one of the first canonical uses of intersectionality (see Collins & Bilge, 2016; Collins, 
1999) in sport management research, Walker and Melton (2015) explored the intersection of 
race, gender, and sexual orientation to illuminate women’s experiences working in 
intercollegiate sports. 
 This dissertation adds to the critical work from these scholars while also drawing upon a 
larger history of liberation-focused research in social science (see Feagin, Vera, & Ducey, 2015). 
As such, the study presented here investigates the political economy of the National Football 
League (NFL) to better understand how the character and social structure of NFL ownership 
groups shape the function of the League and/as a political economy. With the NFL being the 
most widely consumed sport league in the United States (US), it is critical for sport management 
scholars to develop understandings of how the League functions within broader society. 
Political Economy 
 According to Sage (2000), the term political economy broadly refers to the inherently 
political nature of economic activity. Gondwe (1992) characterized political economic analysis 




reproduction, in a given social environment or geographical domain, under rules promulgated 
and enforced by a political state” (p. 12). From this perspective, economic and sociopolitical 
issues are intertwined and interdependent, necessitating that these domains be analyzed in 
conjunction with one another (Sage, 2000). “Moreover,” as Sage (2000) stated, “political 
economic analyses typically go beyond issues of efficiency to address basic moral issues of 
social justice, equity and the public good” (p. 261). Therefore, with the current emphasis on 
producing emancipatory knowledge in the field of sport management, political economy serves 
as useful and adequate concept to further contextualize the operation of the NFL and its 
ownership groups. 
 Sage (2000) outlined three primary approaches to political economy analysis: classical 
political economy, neoclassical economics, and radical political economy. Classical political 
economy is characterized by Adam Smith’s early philosophy on capitalism, which would later be 
warped to support contemporary neoliberal politics (Sage, 2000; Werhane, 2000). Neoclassical 
economics sought to move away from the political foundation of economic analysis, opting 
instead for a more fragmented, “scientific” approach to economics. Radical political economy is 
generally characterized by a Marxian approach where contemporary capitalism is viewed as 
subverting the interests of a (theoretically) democratic society. Few studies in the field of sport 
management have explicitly analyzed the political economy of sport (see Rottenberg, 1956; 
Shilbury, 2012; Soucie & Doherty, 1996 as some of the few exceptions). However, there is a 
larger gap in sport management literature regarding political economy analyses that adopt the 
radical approach with the explicit goal of producing liberation-focused research. Reflective of 
broader neoliberal trends in the field of sport management (Newman, 2014), liberation studies in 




inclusion, with occasional researches that are categorized here as being social justice-oriented. In 
other words, mainstream research on – and the practice of – diversity and inclusion remains 
substantially shaped by market forces while social justice-oriented research is often relegated to 
a second-class research status lying on the margins (see, for example, Frisby, 2005; Parks, 1992; 
Slack, 1996). This dissertation explicitly breaks away from the professionalization of liberation 
sociology and instead pulls from radical political economy analysis to further explore the 
potential for conducting liberation studies in the field of sport management. 
Diversity, Inclusion, and Social Justice 
In recent years, the topics of diversity, inclusion, and social justice have garnered an 
increasing amount of attention from sport management scholars. In the book, Diversity and 
Inclusion in Sport Organizations: A Multilevel Perspective, sport management scholar George 
Cunningham (2019) outlined six factors that have led to increased interest in diversity and 
inclusion in the field of sport management. These developments include: (a) changing 
demographics, (b) changes in the nature of work, (c) legal mandates, (d) social pressures, (e) 
negatives effects associated with exclusionary practices, and (f) the organizational value of 
diversity and inclusion (Cunningham, 2019). However, in response to the professional 
construction of diversity and inclusion in both sport and non-sport organizations, many scholars 
have argued that the organizational and managerial practice of diversity and inclusion obstructs 
progressive change toward social justice (Embrick, Collins, & Dodson, 2018; Weems, Garner, 
Oshiro, & Singer, 2017). The professionalization of diversity and inclusion often allows 
organizations and their top managers to adopt seemingly progressive policies while avoiding 




Drawing from more of the social justice orientation, scholars have added to this growing 
body of research by further exploring the degree(s) to which oppression is embedded in sporting 
organizations (Anderson, 2009; Carter-Francique & Flowers, 2013; Carter-Francique & 
Richardson, 2016; Cunningham, 2003; Fink, 2016; Shaw & Frisby, 2006; Singer, 2005a); how 
sport organizational practices impact various populations (Sartore & Cunningham, 2009; Shaw, 
2006; Singer, 2008; Singer, Harrison, & Bukstein, 2010); how different groups understand and 
navigate sporting environments (Agyemang, Singer, & DeLorme, 2010; Carter-Francique, Hart, 
& Steward, 2013; Singer, 2005b; Walker & Melton, 2015); how some groups actively seek to 
make progressive change in and through sport organizations (Chalip, 1997; Cunningham, 2008, 
2015; Green, 2008; Singer & Cunningham, 2018); and the uniqueness of sport itself as a site for 
resistance and persistence (Cunningham et al., 2019) 
 However, missing from the recent bourgeoning sport management research on issues of 
diversity, inclusion, and social justice has been a sustained focus on the top managers who 
essentially create and maintain organizational cultures of similarity (see Doherty & Chelladurai, 
1999) based on exclusionary and unjust practices. That is, much of the research conducted on 
diversity, inclusion, and social justice in sport management has failed to consistently 
problematize and analyze sport’s white male elite (Weems et al., 2017). While some progress has 
been made for white women and women and men of color within sport organizations, white-
male organizational elites remain a central problem in maintaining systems of inequality (see 
Feagin & Ducey, 2017; Hall, Cullen, & Slack, 1989). For example, research by organizational 
theorist Joan Acker (2012) emphasized the following: 
More white women and more women and men from non-white categories have found 




However, white men are still clearly the dominant category in the top positions in almost 
all organizations. (p. 221) 
Accordingly, the purpose of this research is to add to this general body of work in the field of 
sport management by focusing on team owners as central organizational actors in and through 
the NFL. Further exploring the social and political economy of NFL ownership groups – which 
are overwhelmingly white and male – can provide significant insight into the function of the 
NFL as sport team owners often hold unique positions of power and authority in broader society 
(Flint & Eitzen, 1987). 
Organizations and Top Managers 
As management scholar Barry Staw (1991) noted, “if we probe the organizational action, 
we will find an individual decision maker behind the scene… Organizational actions can 
therefore be individual behavior under the cloak of a larger, more impersonal entity” (p. 807). 
Because of this influential role of top decision-makers, organizations themselves often take on 
the characteristics of their internal elite. Miller and Dröge (1986) demonstrated how needs for 
achievement of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) can be a significant predictor of organizational 
formalization, integration, and centralization. Thus, Staw (1991) suggested that management 
scholars could add to organization theory literature by examining “key organizational decision 
makers, such as the CEO and the set of top executives in a firm” (p. 812). These top decision-
makers shape organizational culture (O’Reilly, Caldwell, & Chatman, 1991) and behavioral 
dispositions (Staw, 1991) ipso facto operating as central organizational actors. 
However, despite the centrality of top managers in shaping organizational structure, 
culture, and behavior, little research in the field of sport management has focused on the political 




discussion of sport owners in the academic fields of sociology and communications (e.g., Flint & 
Eizen, 1987; Harvey, Law, & Cantelon, 2001; Law, Harvey, & Kemp, 2002), as well as in the 
writing of some prominent, critical journalists (e.g., Zirin, 2018). However, sport management 
scholars have yet to reflexively address this topic in and through the study of sport organizations. 
Therefore, the current study aims to take a step in this direction by investigating the political 
economy of the NFL, its ownership groups, and the intersections thereof. To investigate these 
issues, I draw from various critical social science (CSS) perspectives to contextualize and better 
understand the social, political, and economic realities of owning an NFL franchise. According 
to Flint and Eitzen (1987), a central political aspect of any pursuit of profit in a capitalist 
economy is ownership. Ownership is conceptualized here as referring to “a full range of 
economic relations, from entrepreneurial freedom of operation to the refined security of 
monopoly capitalism; from the independent pursuit of self-interest to the control of market 
exigencies by an interlocking corporate directorate” (Flint & Eitzen, 1987, p. 18). 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The current research seeks to bridge the gap between CSS perspectives on power, 
intersectionality, and ownership, and research that seeks to better understand the political 
economy of sport. Building this understanding can not only help scholars better understand the 
who, what, when, where, and how of sport ownership but also how these realities (re)produce and 
are substantiated by social systems of domination. To investigate this issue, I primarily draw 
from the sociological framework of the elite-white-male dominance system (Feagin & Ducey, 
2017). Accordingly, the primary research question for the study is as follows: How does the 
character and social structure of NFL ownership relate to the elite-white-male dominance 




political economy of the NFL; and (b) what is the function of the NFL within the larger political 
economy? 
Answering these research questions is significant for the field of sport management as 
Slack and Parent (2006) have noted that all organizations are political, yet “Few studies in sport 
management have specifically examined sport organizations as systems of political activity” (p. 
12). The authors also discussed how researchers in the field of sport management have largely 
failed to account for sport organizations as instruments of domination (Slack & Parent, 2006). 
However, as informed by the framework of the elite-white-male dominance system (Feagin & 
Ducey, 2017), the question of political domination then becomes: Whose domination is taking 
place through sport organizations, and how? Whose political activity is advanced through the 
routine functioning of sport leagues such as the NFL? This dissertation addresses both of these 
concerns by examining how elite factions of predominantly white men actively use the NFL as a 
medium to further particular political agendas along with the role(s) that the NFL plays in 
contributing to political and economic domination. 
FRAMEWORK 
 Three frameworks are used in conjunction with one another to investigate the political 
economy of NFL ownership: (1) character and social structure (Mills & Gerth, 1953); (2) the 
elite-white-male dominance system (Feagin & Ducey, 2017); and (3) interlocking directorates 
(Allen, 1978; Dooley, 1969). Each of these are discussed below along with how they may help to 
better understand the NFL and its ownership groups. 
Character and Social Structure 
 In Character and Social Structure, C. Wright Mills and Hans Gerth (1953) presented an 




within and are simultaneously shaped by particular social contexts. As defined by the authors, 
character structure refers to “the relatively stabilized integration of the organism’s psychic 
structure linked with the social roles of the person” (p. 22). Thus, character structure is rooted in 
the idea of an individual as a biological organism while understanding that individuals are also 
shaped by a combination of social roles made available to them through a larger social context 
(Mills & Gerth, 1953). Roles that individuals play as persons constitute the foundational unit of 
institutions; and institutions constitute the basic unit which Mills and Gerth (1953) use to 
conceptualize social structure. Though they acknowledged that social structure is more than the 
interrelations of institutions, the authors argued that institutions at least make up the basic 
framework of social structure (Mills & Gerth, 1953). 
 The term institutional order refers to all institutions within a social structure that serve 
the same teleological function (Mills & Gerth, 1953). Mills and Gerth (1953) delineated five 
institutional orders that comprise social structure in the Western world: the political order, 
economic order, military order, kinship order, and religious order. Within each institutional order 
are various institutions (e.g., religious institutions grouped together are referred to as the 
religious order).  These institutional orders then interlink to form particular social structures. Yet, 
while the authors offered typological constructions of five distinct institutional orders, they 
pointed to how modern social structures have become more “integrated, and… interlinked under 
more total control” (Mills & Gerth, 1953, p. 27). Using these and other concepts as building 
blocks, social structure is then defined as being: 
… composed of institutional orders and spheres. The precise weight which each 




ways in which they are related with one another – these determine the unity and the 
composition of a social structure. (p. 30-31) 
Emphasizing the potentially dynamic nature of social structures, Mills and Gerth (1953) 
discussed how other institutional orders may need to be defined or further elaborated upon to 
more accurately reflect a given context. Although character structure and social structure are 
presented as seemingly distinct but connected concepts by the authors’ model, Mills and Gerth 
(1953) further stressed the interrelated nature of character and social structure, arguing for an 
integrated understanding; for “the psychology of institutions and the sociology of persons… 
For… if we are to understand the single human being, we must develop a general view of 
institutions and social structures” (p. 165). Political economy is enmeshed within these orders 
and structures, while also offering a perspective accenting the distinct functions of social 
structure in contemporary capitalist society. Moreover, research suggests that individuals play 
unique roles within each order (Stinchcombe, 1997); specifically, as social structure both shapes 
and is shaped by character structure (Mills & Gerth, 1953). 
 Simultaneously understanding the social structure of a context and the various 
institutional orders, Mills and Gerth (1953) discussed how individual persons are shaped or 
formed by these structures, which ultimately modify external conduct as well as inner life (p. 
173). Institutions select or reject individuals through formal and informal recruitment, explicitly 
training or socializing individuals as instituted roles are internalized, and co-constructing the 
psychic structure of an individual. This process is mediated by the symbol spheres of each 
intersecting institutional order which provide cues for individuals in socially defined situations. 
 The current study makes use of this framework by emphasizing the importance of NFL 




structure. However, as understood by Mills and Gerth (1953), this framework needs to be further 
enmeshed within a particular context to draw out its usefulness. Thus, I also draw from the 
framework of the elite-white-male dominance system to situate the study as taking place within a 
particular social and political context. 
Elite-White-Male Dominance System 
 To a substantial degree, the elite-white-male dominance system (Feagin & Ducey, 2017) 
can be conceptualized as an extension of the work by Mills and Gerth (1953). This framework 
explicitly contextualizes a more general discussion of character and social structure by focusing 
on the power elite (see Mills, 1965); emphasizing the specific functions of three main social 
systems deliberately created by and for this ruling elite over the course of centuries in the US: 
systemic sexism (including heterosexism), systemic racism, and systemic classism (capitalism). 
Although classism and capitalism are not necessarily synonyms, the two terms are used 
interchangeably here as capitalism is the primary system through which systemic capitalism 
operates in the US (Feagin & Ducey, 2017). 
 Building the foundation for the elite-white-male dominance system framework, Feagin 
and Ducey (2017) discuss the centrality of these “hierarchical, oligarchical, and constantly 
intertwined systems” (p. 9) in the history of European colonialism and imperialism. The authors 
linked these intertwining hierarchical systems to the ancient Greek notion of the Great Chain of 
Being, whereby there were gods, or God in the case of Christianity, and varying levels of inferior 
groups with each group being superior to the group(s) below it. This particular perspective, with 
white men at the top of the hierarchy just below God, was “an integral part of English and other 
European men’s sexist, elitist-class, and Eurocentric framing of the world as they invaded the 




in (Western) European societies substantially shaped the development of society’s institutions as 
the institutions created by Europeans came to reflect these same hierarchical structures – 
ultimately buttressing the power and influence of the white male elite. Moreover, the framework 
emphasizes the intersection of the race-, class-, and gender-based systems of oppression and how 
these systems codetermine and co-reproduce one another. For instance, Feagin and Ducey stated 
the following: “within the modern capitalistic system important economic systems are often 
significantly determined and defined by the intersecting impacts of the sexist and racist 
subsystems” (p. 12). In other words, the class, gender, and race systems in the US and beyond 
coalesce to form a single system designed to unjustly enrich white male elites. 
 Feagin and Ducey (2017) also outlined a developing conceptualization of systemic 
sexism, which they defined as “well-institutionalized societal patterns of subordinate and 
dominant social positions and role, respectively, for women and men in a male-dominated 
hierarchical society” (p. 19). Key tenets of systemic sexism outlined by Feagin and Ducey 
included discriminatory practices toward women by men, the power and privileges ascribed to 
men within the dominant gender hierarchy, the institutionalized social reproduction of gender 
inequalities, and the male sexist frame that rationalizes and sustains the everyday oppression of 
women. Specifically, the authors discussed the European roots of this sexist system, and how the 
“Founding Fathers” effectively founded a nation based on the racial and gender assumptions of 
an elite class of White men. The development of white masculinity took on an explicitly 
racialized and nationalist framing, particularly throughout the 1800s in which a new, White 
Protestant-defined standard of masculinity became the societal norm. In addition, the authors 
detailed the development of both systemic classism and systemic racism in the US that were 




Africans/African Americans. As both racism and classism became institutionalized in the new 
American capitalist system, elite white men and their acolytes were able to manufacture a system 
in which they generated, shaped, and/or controlled the institutions that significantly shaped the 
lives of millions of others around the world. 
 A central construct in the elite-white-male dominance system is that of oligopolistic 
capitalism. Contemporary capitalism, Feagin and Ducey (2017) argued, 
…is aggressively oligopolistic – that is, dominated in most of its major economic sectors 
by relatively few large firms… [It] is mostly white-male-controlled at the top, a reality 
that has routinely made a significant difference in how its capitalistic operations are also 
racialized and masculinized. (p. 144) 
As perhaps one of the primary contradictions of free-market ideologies and the deregulation of 
capital markets, neoliberalism in practice fuels the oligopolistic power of a small number of 
transnational corporations “in ever-expanding neocolonial and economic-concentration efforts” 
(p. 145). As a global-imperial form of capitalism focused on the consolidation of power, this 
oligopoly is dominated by mostly white men whose power status is dependent upon the three 
main subsystems of oppression (sexism, racism, capitalism). Thus, the imperial goals of this 
group involves the exportation and imposition of these systems of oppression on a global scale. 
To do so, however, requires an extensive network with global influence within major political 
and economic institutions. Accordingly, Feagin and Ducey noted that “this international network 
usually operates effectively because most of the world’s major economic actors are well 
‘networked and successfully hooked into… a structured framework in interlocking financial and 




scholars in understanding the political economy of elite white men in the U.S. and beyond is to 
investigate network structures, dynamics, and functions with a focus on their power implications.  
 In addition to elite networks of white men and their neocolonial aims, Feagin and Ducey 
noted the importance of acolytes in both the operation of the broader system and its persistence. 
Given that elite white men cannot be everywhere at once, nor do they conduct themselves in a 
manner in which they are the most visible actors, the white male elite depend on acolytes to carry 
out their missions. Acolytes tend to occupy a social rank just below the ruling elite. Though there 
are modest numbers of white women and men and women of color comprising this group, 
scholars suggest that they “can only move into the mostly lower reaches of the elite by means of 
power white male sponsors who provide them access to critical educational and other social 
networks” (p. 186). Thus, the societal power of elite white men tends to depend upon the 
continued operation of acolytes who work together with the ruling elite through specific 
organizations, positions, operations, and resources. Overall, these networked organizations are 
…power bases due to the information and material resources their leaders control, along 
with the ability leaders have to hire and fire underlings, form alliances with other 
organizational leaders, and many other prerogatives… the specialists in managing, 
coordinating, and obtaining outside resources have the power advantage from the start. 
(Domhoff, 2007, p. 3-4) 
As such, research investigating the elite-white-male dominance system must seek to uncover 
what organizations play central roles in the production and maintenance of societal power, who 
are the key actors within these organizations, and what the mechanisms are through which this 
process is accomplished (Feagin & Ducey, 2017). In the current research project, I draw from 




organization plays in empowering its internal elite, to probe a broader political and economic 
network, and to explore the role of the NFL in engendering the political and economic 
domination of a mostly white male capitalistic elite.  
Interlocking Directorates 
 As a complementary framework to the concepts of oligopoly capitalism and the revolving 
door, interlocking directorates are characterized by an individual being affiliated with one 
organization while sitting on the board of directors of another (Allen, 1978; Dooley, 1969; Mintz 
& Schwartz, 1981; Mizruchi, 1996; Palmer, 2002). According to Mills (1965), the term 
“interlocking directorate” is more than a phrase or idea: 
…it points to a solid feature of the facts of business life, and to a sociological anchor of 
the community of interest, the unification of outlooks and policy that prevails among the 
propertied class… As a minimum inference, it must be said that such arrangements 
permit an interchange of views in a convenient and more or less formal way among those 
who share the interests of the corporate rich. (p. 123) 
 Much of the research in this area has pointed to the capital implications of interlocks, 
specifically because of the central roles played by banking and insurance institutions (Dooley, 
1969; Mariolis, 1975, 1983; Mizruchi, 1996). However, while corporations do have capital 
interest in gaining financial assets through interlocking with other key individuals and firms, the 
reasons for forming interlocks and their actual functions are more than financial in nature (Mintz 
& Schwartz, 1981; Mizruchi, 1996). For example, a study by Burris (2005) found that social ties 
formed via common membership of corporate board contributed more to political cohesion than 
did purely economic interest. Further exploring these political implications, Burris (2005) not 




directly results in political praxis, actively shaping a given political landscape. Drawing from 
data on campaign contributions and network analysis methods, Burris (2005) empirically 
demonstrated how interlocking directorates facilitate political cohesion and behavior for 
corporate elites. Thus, research in this vein should examine the firm as well as “the ties among 
individual corporate elites and the consequences of those ties for political action” (Burris, 2005, 
p. 253). While research on sport owners and interlocking directorates has found seemingly 
contradictory evidence (Flint & Eitzen, 1987), there is a need to further explore the applicability 
of the concept in today’s context. Therefore, this study further investigates both the relevancy of 
political and economic interlocks in relation to the NFL as a league and NFL ownership groups. 
The next chapter provides an overview of relevant theoretical and empirical research 
addressing the character structure of sport owners, NFL team ownership and governance, and 
sport-based network studies more broadly. Building this foundation helps situate the current 
research within the field of sport management by addressing key gaps in understanding the 
social, political, and economic realities of sport ownership. Chapter 3 outlines the research 
design and methods that were employed in this study. Specifically, the study draws from the 
bricolage design to carry out a collective case study on the NFL and its ownership groups. 
Chapter 4 discusses the findings of this study in terms of themes relating to NFL ownership 
groups. Chapters 5-7 further discuss the meaning of these findings as contextualized within the 
political economy of the NFL, a mediated NFL and the production of legitimacy, and the 
(re)production of elite-white-male dominance in and through the NFL. Lastly, chapter 8 








In this chapter, a literature review is provided in relation to key concepts emanating from 
the research questions. Namely, I overview literature on the character structure of sport owners, 
the politics of sport ownership and league governance with an emphasis on the NFL, and the 
overlapping areas of sport-based networks, governance, and oligopolism. Doing so situates the 
current study within an interdisciplinary body of research while also seeking to add to these 
discussions by drawing from the sociological framework outlined by Feagin and Ducey (2017). 
THE CHARACTER STRUCTURE OF SPORT OWNERS 
 A dearth of literature exists addressing the character structure of sport owners. In 
Character and Social Structure, Mills and Gerth (1953) defined character structure as “the 
relatively stabilized integration of the organism’s psychic structure linked with the social roles of 
the person” (Mills & Gerth, 1953, p. 22). Character structure is similar to Bourdieu’s concept of 
habitus, which was defined by Kitchin and Howe (2013) as the “unconscious process where 
wider culture is imbibed and embodied in individuals, and as a result informs their actions” (p. 
128). However, for the purposes of the review here I elect to use the term “character structure” as 
it is a more accessible linguistic device for understanding the character of sport owners and how 
this is inter-linked with social systems. 
 As two exceptions to the lack of research examining sport owners in general, Flint and 
Eitzen’s (1987) investigation of the character of sport owners and Brower’s (1977) analysis of 
mainly professional football team owners each provide piercing takes on the interrelated nature 




of 141 professional sports team owners in football, basketball, baseball, hockey, and soccer from 
1982-1984 the found that team owners demonstrated a uniquely “entrepreneurial character 
uncommon in regulated monopoly capitalism” (p. 19). Their research found that 68% of owners’ 
corporate holdings lied in communications (media/television), oil production, or real estate/land 
development, all of which the authors categorized as entrepreneurial capitalist investments (Flint 
& Eitzen, 1987). 
 Moreover, research has shown that sport owners occupy unique positions in the 
reproduction of social relations through the political economy of sport (Flint & Eitzen, 1987). 
For example, Brower (1977) found that owners embodied a paternalistic form of social 
organization in relation to the players on their teams: “Strong feelings of paternalism reside in 
some owners; they look upon their players as does a father upon his children” (p. 85). However, 
this orientation of sport owners went well beyond a father-son relationship; for example, when 
owners get angry at players who are not “grateful” for their (owners’) benefactorship (Brower, 
1977, p. 86). 
Further interrogating the problematic nature of owner-paternalism, Brower (1977) 
highlighted the case of Dick Gordon, a black All-Pro wide receiver who had issues with the 
Chicago Bears and their former (white male) owner, George Halas. According to the Associated 
Press in 1971 Gordon described the Bears organization as “an antiquated establishment… 
incapable of dealing with the modern, liberated player, of understanding his thinking. [The 
players] are treated like serfs” (as cited in Brower, 1977, p. 87). Responding to Gordon’s 
remarks, Halas stated the following:  
… [Gordon] knows what his problems were and how much more serious they would have 




He knows he could have done nothing himself in any of those troubled areas and 
he knows that he has yet to acknowledge what I did or to express even a simple “thank 
you.” (as cited in Brower, 1977, p. 87) 
Thus, Halas embodied both a hierarchical and paternalistic form of social organization and 
expressed his personal frustration toward Gordon. Also evident at the intersection of these 
interrelated forms of Halas’ character structure was a certain arrogance; a sense of entitlement to 
being positively viewed as the benefactor, despite Gordon noting that players were treated like 
serfs by Halas. 
 Another example provided by Brower (1977) was that of (white male) Art Modell, the 
former Cleveland Browns owner. It was reported at the time that Modell had told Walter Beach, 
a black cornerback who had been reading Elijah Muhammad’s Message to a Black Man, “Why, 
I’ve done more for the colored than the colored do for themselves” (as cited in Brower, 1977, p. 
87). This example clearly demonstrated a racialized form of paternalism by Modell, one 
extended to all blacks as a racial group rather than to any individual player. As Brower (1977) 
noted, “Paternalistic owners may feel virtuous about helping players by giving them employment 
and high salaries in comparison to most occupations. However, their attempted care and control 
of players and their steering of the entire league operation have racist consequences” (p. 87). 
Thus, research on sport team owners characterizes ownership as being entrepreneurially 
capitalist, paternal, and racialized. 
Despite these alarming instances shedding light on the character structure of NFL team 
owners in the 1970s and 1980s, there is a lack of research in the field of sport management that 
investigates the extent to which these individuals embody social positions of domination today 




primary purpose of the current study is to further explore the character structure of NFL owners 
in relation to broader social systems (e.g., race, gender, class), and to understand the structure 
and function of the NFL and/as a political economy. Doing so, however, requires an overview of 
the governance structure of the NFL as it has been organized by and for team owners over the 
course of many decades. 
OWNERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE OF THE NFL 
 Although team owners and their character structures function at the core of the NFL, it is 
important to review the NFL as the organizational tool through which team owners are 
empowered. Thus, in this section I provide an overview of the formation of the League, its 
internal structure and functions, and how the organization relates to ownership as an active 
process. The NFL, originally named the American Professional Football Association (APFA), 
was first formed in 1920 in Canton, Ohio. The first meeting, held on August 20, 1920 at Ralph 
Hay’s Hupmobile dealership, consisted of (all-white male) representatives from four Ohio 
League teams: Ralph Hay and Jim Thorpe of the Canton Bulldogs; Jimmy O’Donnell and 
Stanley Cofall of the Cleveland Tigers; Carl Storck of the Dayton Triangles; and Frank Nied and 
Art Ranney of the Akron Pros. At this initial meeting, the representatives explored ways to bring 
order to the professional football scene in the US, discussing various issues related to player 
agency, salaries, and the control thereof (Crippen, 2009). 
On September 17, 1920, a second meeting was held by the same group along with 
representatives from other professional teams including Leo Lyons of the Rochester Jeffersons; 
Doc Young of the Hammond Pros; Walter Flanigan of the Rock Island Independents; Earl Ball 
of the Muncie Flyers; George Halas and Morgan O’Brien of the Decatur Staleys; and Chris 




Jim Thorpe being elected as the president of the APFA, Stanley Cofall as the vice-president, and 
Art Ranney as the secretary-treasurer. Following the inaugural APFA season, the league 
reorganized with Joe Carr named as president and Carl Storck named as secretary-treasurer. 
According to the NFL’s website, Carr then moved the Association's headquarters to Columbus, 
drafted a league constitution and by-laws, gave teams territorial rights, restricted player 
movements, developed membership criteria for the franchises, and issued standings for the first 
time so the APFA would have a clear champion (NFL, 2018a). The name of the APFA was later 
changed to the National Football League in 1922. 
Over the course of the first few decades of the NFL’s operation, League teams were fairly 
unstable. Many franchises joined the League and many failed, particularly with the advent of the 
Great Depression and the Second World War. Of the original charter members, only the Decatur 
Staleys and the Chicago Cardinals are still in operation today (now known as the Chicago Bears 
and Arizona Cardinals respectively). Throughout the turbulence of the NFL’s early years, the 
franchises that survived were able to amass significant power through political and economic 
means, eventually drawing criticisms as being monopolistic organizations (Neale, 1964; Topkis, 
1948). When Pete Rozelle took over as Commissioner in 1959, the NFL made concerted efforts 
to stabilize as a professional sport league. One of Rozelle’s first major acts as Commissioner was 
to install the revenue sharing structure, in which teams would share gate and television revenues 
(Mason, 1997). The new structure helped stabilize small-market teams; and while large-market 
teams briefly lost out on television revenue, this allowed the NFL to begin collectively 




In 1961, Rozelle negotiated an exclusive deal to broadcast NFL games with CBS worth 
$9.3 million (Sandomir, 1996). However, given the collusive nature of the deal the NFL and 
CBS had struck, a federal court ruled that the contract violated antitrust laws (Shea, 2015). In the 
wake of this decision, Rozelle and the NFL quickly lobbied Congress members resulting in the 
passing of the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 – an Act that exempted professional sport 
leagues from violating antitrust laws when negotiating radio and television broadcasting rights 
(Anderson, 1994; Sports Broadcasting Act, 2000). Prior to 1963, NFL teams were in charge of 
licensing their intellectual property and marketing trademarked items; however, this changed in 
1963 with the formation of National Football League Properties which then enabled pooled 
licensing and marketing (American Needle, Inc. v. NFL et al., 2010). This stabilization and 
consolidation of the NFL would be further advanced in 1966 when Congress approved the NFL’s 
merger with the American Football League, granting the League more protection from antitrust 
laws (Sandomir, 2010). In 1966, the NFL was designated as a Section 501(c)6 organization when 
the definition of non-profit, trade associations in the Internal Revenue Code was modified to 
include “professional football leagues” in its definition (Dosh, 2013; Internal Revenue Service, 
2006; Kang, 2014; Williams, 2016). According to Easterbrook’s (2013) article in The Atlantic, 
the NFL was formally granted “permission to function as a monopoly: the 1966 law was 
effectively a license for the NFL owners to print money” (para. 16). For decades to follow, the 
NFL would operate under this classification of a non-profit, trade association as it continued to 
grow as an organization. 
 In the 1980s, the NFL was further accused of violating antitrust laws. In 1980, Al Davis 




Coliseum Commission v. NFL et al. (1980a), because Davis had been blocked from moving the 
franchise to the city of Los Angeles. The District Court ruled that the NFL was in violation of the 
Sherman Act (Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. NFL et al., 1980a). The NFL 
appealed this ruling and the decision was reversed (Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission 
v. NFL et al., 1980b). After a series of appeals, Al Davis and the Raiders were able to move to 
Los Angeles in 1982 (Asher & Shapiro, 1982). In 1986, the United States Football League 
(USFL) won an antitrust case against the NFL in US Football League et al.  v. NFL et al. 
(“USFL”) (1986). When the USFL’s owner of the Washington Generals (Donald J. Trump) was 
prevented from purchasing an NFL franchise, the owner filed the antitrust suit against the NFL. 
The court found that the NFL violated antitrust law and exercised monopoly power (US Football 
League et al. v. NFL et al., 1986). However, the jury could not distinguish actual losses incurred 
by Donald Trump or the USFL, and the USFL were awarded a total of $1 in damages (this award 
was tripled to a total of $3 under anti-trust laws). The USFL filed an appeal seeking injunctive 
relief and more in damages, but the decision of the District Court was affirmed (US Football 
League et al. v. NFL et al., 1988). 
 Following the antitrust suits of the 1980s – which did little to structurally impact the 
operation of the NFL – the League continued to grow in popularity. Maintaining its non-profit 
status, revenue swelled with the increasing value of television broadcasting. However, as 
revenue increased and the league continued to grow, so too did its public criticisms as a non-
profit organization (Adams & Brock, 1997; Kahn, 2000; Wamsley, 2002). In 2015, after 73 years 
of tax-exempt status, the NFL officially dropped its status as a non-profit organization amid the 




Commissioner Roger Goodell, the owners of the NFL decided to formally incorporate the 
League office (Schrotenboer, 2015). 
Now, as an incorporated organization which has historically functioned as a trade 
association, the two primary functions of the NFL (as a structured organization) relate to 
financial solvency for League members and impacting public policy (e.g., see Watson, 2002). 
However, differing from other trade associations generally tasked with representing the interests 
of members within the same industry, the purpose of the NFL is: “To promote and foster the 
primary business of League members, each member being an owner of a professional football 
club location in the United States” (NFL Constitution & Bylaws, 2006). As such, the NFL has 
historically been unique as a trade association in the multiplicity of political and economic 
interests of League members; which is rarely confined to the individual football club which they 
own. Accordingly, further exploration of League membership and governance is warranted to 
understand how this impacts the function of the NFL as a whole. In other words, it is important 
to understand who is granted a seat at the proverbial table, what their motives are, and what 
benefits they derive from membership within the League. 
Membership in and within the NFL is restricted. Any person or entity seeking to become 
a member of the NFL “must be approved by the affirmative vote of no less than three-fourths of 
the members. A three-fourths majority is also required to transfer a membership to another 
entity” (Lentze, 1995, p. 68), thus creating an exclusive organization relative to the roles of trade 
associations across other industries (this rule is later referred to as the ¾ rule). There are two 
substantial sources of authority within the NFL stemming from its Executive Committee and the 




generally the owner or another top executive from the club. The Executive Committee has its 
power granted to it by the Constitution of the NFL and it acts by affirmative vote of no less than 
three-fourths. The Commissioner of the NFL is present at each of the Executive Committee’s 
meetings. Elected by the owners, the Commissioner of the NFL holds disciplinary power, the 
authority to preside over dispute resolution, and decision-making authority (which includes the 
authority to appoint other officers and committees).  
Much literature on the governance structure of the NFL has emphasized the unique 
position of power and authority held by the Commissioner once elected. For example, though 
many liken the role of the Commissioner to that of a Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Lentze 
(1995) teased out the nuanced nature of the Commissioner’s position that makes it unique. While 
the CEO of a corporation is generally subject to the control of a board of directors, the 
Commissioner does not answer to League owners once elected. As Lentze (1995) noted, 
…the Commissioner acts as an employee of the league, but is not under the control and 
supervision of own employer. Therefore the employed Commissioner represents an 
almost autonomous authority within the internal structure of the league, uncontrolled by 
its principal owners. (p. 72) 
This “almost autonomous authority” granted to the Commissioner gives this individual unique 
organizational power, such as through the “best interests” clause (Mondelli, 2017; Parlow, 2009). 
As a principal investigator, prosecutor, and adjudicator, the Commissioner has the authority to 
oversee and influence any decision related to the welfare of the League (Cole, 2015; Renicker, 
2015). This includes the power to influence, or even to punish, franchise owners (Parlow, 2009). 
For example, the Commissioner can fine owners if they engage in behaviors deemed detrimental 




about approving admission into the league by a new member or the transfer of membership. 
Moreover, as the locus of control within the NFL, “the Commissioner interprets and establishes 
policy and procedure with respect to the league provisions” (Lentze, 1995, p. 74). While there 
are questions as to why team owners would willingly subject themselves to the power of the 
(elected) Commissioner (Mondelli, 2017), the likely reason for doing so is that the role of the 
Commissioner, as an “impartial” authority, prevents judicial interference with league affairs 
(Lentze, 1995; Parlow, 2009). Additionally, Lentze (1995) opined that the power of the 
Commissioner was ultimately necessary to protect “other participants from the owners’ 
monopoly power,” especially as the League moved toward corporate ownership (p. 80). 
 Understanding the trend toward the corporatization of professional sport, Lentze (1995) 
weighed the pros and cons of the traditional Commissioner model versus a pure corporate model 
along with what these two organizational forms might mean to the owners. In the traditional 
model, the Commissioner held significant power as an “impartial” authority – though this was 
not without confliction. While the Commissioner of the NFL was historically tasked with 
maintaining the integrity of the League (Parlow, 2009), Lentze (1995) contended that there 
existed “at least a strong conflict of interest for the Commissioner” (p. 81). For example, the 
Commissioner had a direct interest in “not offending a bloc of owners in order to protect his own 
job security and to avoid dismissal by the offended owners” (p. 81). Thus, he had a vested 
interest in staying in the good favor of League owners to ensure his re-election. From the 
owners’ perspective, this traditional Commissioner fulfilled two essential functions: (1) 
providing due process for internal activities and preventing judicial interference; and (2) through 





 In outlining a pure corporate model, Lentze (1995) discussed how the owners would act 
more so as a board of directors with the exclusive power to manage league affairs. Ultimately, 
this model would grant the owners more power and authority as it related to the League, with the 
Commissioner or CEO acting “under direct control and general supervision of the owners” (p. 
84). Additionally, the corporate model would grant owners the power to deliberate over policy 
decisions without fear of reprisal from the Commissioner because in the corporate organizational 
form, the board’s decision is final. Subsequently, putting this decision-making power in the 
hands of the owners would increase efficiency and accountability. However, while owner 
accountability would increase, there are significant drawbacks. Namely, whereas the traditional 
Commissioner model provided an authority figure to balance the interests of various stakeholders 
(e.g., owners, sponsors, players, and fans), a pure corporate model does not provide such a 
system. Thus, given the cultural significance of a sport like professional football in the U.S., the 
increase in organizational efficiency and accountability could potentially come at the expense of 
the public upon which the sport depends (Lentze, 1995). 
Given the unique history and structure of the NFL, some scholars have sought to better 
understand the structure and function of the League in relation to its owners. For example, sport 
management scholar Daniel Mason (1997) drew from agency theory to investigate how owners 
sometimes acted opportunistically to the detriment of the League as a whole, as well as what 
mechanisms might serve to dissuade such opportunism (e.g., the revenue sharing structure). 
However, according to Atkinson and colleagues (1988) who also drew from agency theory to 
investigate NFL owners, owners do not act as pure profit maximizers; rather, NFL owners 
generally seek to maximize utility “in both profit and the private, nonmonetary benefits” (p. 41). 




1995; Brower, 1977; Quirk & El Hodiri, 1974). With the limitations of agency theory as a 
framework for understanding organizations (see Perrow, 2014), a broader scope of analysis is 
helpful in further investigating what “nonmonetary” factors influence NFL owners. 
Though it has been empirically shown that there are varying motives of NFL owners 
extending beyond profit-maximization solely within the League, few scholars have investigated 
the social and political power afforded to sport owners. As one of the few exceptions to this, 
Brower (1977) suggested the legitimizing aspects of sport “proves useful to the power elite since 
athletics in general, and major professional team sports in particular, are pivotal in their impact 
on the ideology of the society in which they are embedded” (p. 79). Particularly, Brower (1977) 
emphasized elites’ commitment to the ideology of sport’s neutrality as a social and political 
commitment: 
The people in charge generate consensus for support of their institution by keeping the 
“inappropriate matters” – e.g., race and politics – out of it. The problem with so restricted 
a view and its smooth strategy is that no place is left in which to confront the 
“inappropriate” issues. To close off these topics is a political act, the purpose of which is 
to prevent any kind of correction from ever taking place. It is accomplished by inferring 
that the only place for a consideration of such issues is in Congress, not in schools, 
hospital, or football clubs. This political act is a technique which maintains the aura of 
neutrality and thereby induces the public to believe that football is one American 
institution that affords everybody an equal chance. The cover for silence is the neutrality 
argument: political reform does not belong in football. (p. 97, italics added for emphasis) 
Considering the long history of political activism in and through sport to impact society (Blinde, 




Nauright & Wiggins, 2014), the commitment to the “neutrality” of professional football – and 
subsequently, the social and political status quo – is indeed a political act; one in which team 
owners and other societal elites have a vested interest. Thus, it is not only important to 
understand the character structure of owners, and the powers and privileges afforded to them 
through team ownership, but to investigate their broader network (i.e., the “power elite”) to 
understand the significance of team ownership in contemporary society. 
As various stakeholders with capital interests in a league such as the NFL seek to take 
advantage of its cultural prominence for economic, social, political, and psychological reasons, 
team owners act as the controlling group through which the production of the NFL takes place. 
Thus, spanning a broader network of stakeholders, the owners of the NFL work together to 
control the product of professional football. Speaking to the owners’ benefits through this 
oligopolistic form of governance, Brower (1977) stated the following: “This modified socialistic, 
and collusive, arrangement insures higher profits for a larger proportion of owners than would a 
strictly capitalistic arrangement” (p. 83). Because of this arrangement, it is important to 
investigate how the governance structure of the NFL is representative of and dominated by this 
uniquely collusive network. Thus, in addition to the character structure of team owners and the 
league structure of the NFL, I survey literature on sporting networks, governance, and 
oligopolism to further explore these ownership-based networks. Moreover, this review 
adequately situates the current study within a growing body of research on social networks and 
the influence thereof by focusing on the role(s) of elite networks in and through sport. 
SPORT NETWORKS, GOVERNANCE, AND OLIGOPOLISM 
As an earlier formation of network studies in the field of management, Tichy, Tushman, 




make more explicit “the web of direct and indirect relationships between organizations” (p. 507). 
Arguing that network analysis is an underutilized lens for conceptualizing, analyzing, and 
understanding organizations, the authors postulated six research agendas for network studies on 
organizations: interorganizational relationships; organizations and their boundaries; career 
patterns and succession; organization change; design configuration; and power and political 
processes. Interorganizational relationships (IORs) referred to how organization/management 
scholars could examine the “wide-reaching external networks linking organizations” (p. 516) and 
how they systematically interlock. The research agenda of organizations and their boundaries 
was concerned with both boundary permeability and boundary-spanning networks. Career 
patterns and succession was conceptualized in relation to the complexity of roles and functions 
of networks in career mobility. In relation to organization change, Tichy and colleagues (1979) 
argued that “Network analysis provides (a) diagnostic tools for the planning of change, (b) tools 
for measuring the impact of change efforts, and (c) a set of explanatory variables for how change 
agents affect organizations” (p. 516). Their formulation of design configuration sought to 
address the significance of emergent networks which canonical uses of contingency theories had 
overlooked in relation to various design configurations. Lastly, in seeking to address power and 
political processes, the authors pulled from previous literature to suggest the following: “The 
study of organizations and leadership behavior from a political perspective is more amenable to 
systematic analysis based on a network perspective” (p. 516, italics added for emphasis). The 
current research emphasizes Tichy and colleagues’ (1979) final point by examining the politics 
of elite sport-based networks and the behaviors/actions of structurally important leaders within 
these networks. In the decades following this formation of network methods/analysis, various 




In the field of sport management, a network-based focus on IORs has drawn attention 
from various scholars (e.g., see Cousens & Slack, 1996). For example, Thibault and Harvey 
(1997) investigated the extent to which IORs influenced Canada’s sport delivery system in the 
midst of significant economic changes. The authors found that while interorganizational linkages 
assisted in the sharing of resources and coordination of work-related activities, they also brought 
with them new challenges such as power struggles, loss of autonomy, asymmetrical 
relationships, and conflicting loyalties. Expanding their scope to look at ten different Canadian 
cities, Frisby, Thibault, and Kikulis (2004) investigated the nature of “under-management” in 
leisure service departments in their attempts to juggle the complex nature of IORs, concluding 
that a lack of structured guidelines, insufficient training, and poor coordination all negatively 
impacted the success of these IORs.  
Katherine Babiak has also contributed significantly to this area of network studies in 
sport management through her focus on sport-centered IORs. In 2003, Babiak conducted a case 
study of a Canadian national sport center in which she explored “the dynamics, challenges, and 
complexities encountered in the establishment, management, and evaluation of multiple 
interorganizational relationships among a nonprofit organization and its partners in the 
government, nonprofit, and private sectors” (p. 1). Her qualitative exploration uncovered several 
dynamics inherent to these IORs including but not limited to interdependence, environmental 
and organizational conditions, existing networks, power imbalances, political/control aspects, 
and partnership management structures. Babiak (2007) would later investigate determinant 
factors that led to the formation of IORs in an effort to better understand this phenomenon and 
provide organizations with tools to help better manage their IORs. In this study, Babiak found 




whether or not IORs developed. Further adding to this research line, Babiak and Thibault (2009) 
investigated the challenges of managing multiple relationships across public, non-profit, and 
private sectors. Participants in their study pointed to a multitude of challenges in managing IORs 
such as “mounting tensions, resource exchange issues, managerial challenges such as negotiation 
and communication breakdowns, and the assignment of roles and responsibilities for actionable 
results” (p. 137). Thus, these findings suggested that while there are many benefits to 
establishing IORs, there are also significant challenges that sport organizations must navigate. 
 Drawing from more of an institutional perspective in the field of management, Jones, 
Hesterly, and Borgatti (1997) introduced a general theory of network governance as a way to 
better conceptualize and analyze exchange conditions and the social mechanisms thereof. 
Network governance can be broadly defined as “coordination characterized by informal social 
systems rather than by bureaucratic structures within firms and formal contractual relationships 
between them” (p. 911). Upon theoretically connecting the previously disjointed theories of 
transaction-cost economics (TCE) and social network theory, the authors advanced a definition 
of their own as a foundation for their contribution to the literature on network governance. 
“Network governance,” stated Jones and colleagues (1997), 
involves a select, persistent, and structured set of autonomous firms (as well as nonprofit 
agencies) engaged in creating products or service based on implicit and open-ended 
contracts to adapt to environmental contingencies and to coordinate and safeguard 
exchanges. These contracts are socially – not legally – binding. (p. 914) 
Ultimately, the authors contended that organizations dependent upon network forms of 
governance rely “more heavily on social coordination and control… than on authority or legal 




authors suggested that future research should seek to identify and analyze other important social 
mechanisms that influence network governance processes. In doing so, five potential research 
agendas moving forward were proposed: (1) investigating macrocultures and their 
content/development; (2) examining the interaction of social mechanisms; (3) optimal size(s) for 
effective network governance; (4) power and thence the exercise of within the network; and (5) 
determining whether networks are a results of efficiency processes or managerial trends and 
institutional processes. 
Relevant to the current discussion are the first, second, and fourth research agendas 
relating to macrocultures, interacting social mechanisms, and power. In discussing the research 
line addressing macrocultures, the authors argued that a key task for organizational scholars is to 
identify “the processes of socialization and institutionalization and whether these vary across 
networks in different domains” (p. 935). Relating to power and its exercise, Jones and colleagues 
(1997) noted that “Any discussion of social structure raises questions of how such structures 
facilitate or constrain the exploitation of power” (p. 936). While this conceptualization of 
network governance informs the current research project, research on network governance in 
general is not without critique. 
 Stemming from the field of political science, Grix and Phillpots (2011) provided an 
empirical counter-example that pushed back against ideal-typical conceptualizations of network 
governance within the broader political economy in the United Kingdom (UK). Focusing on the 
sport policy sector, the authors uncovered a paradoxical form of network governance that 
appeared normal on the surface, but was in reality comprised of several underlying hierarchical 
structures – a phenomenon which the authors termed “asymmetrical network governance” (p. 4). 




that multi-agency governance was a democratizing process, Grix and Phillpots (2011) found that 
this result of democratization did not apply to the sports policy sector. Instead, the authors’ 
examination revealed hierarchical forms of partnerships built upon resource dependency and 
asymmetrical network governance between “policy makers” and “policy takers” (p. 10). Thus, 
the authors concluded that future research seeking to understand why the sports sector adhered to 
this asymmetrical form of network governance should examine cases in “a variety of structural, 
institutional and historically different contexts” (p. 15). Therefore, to further investigate this 
phenomenon in the context of the US, I draw from research coming from the field of sociology 
in an effort to better understand structural and institutional aspects. 
Sociological and communications research on sport and sport organizations has found 
empirical evidence of oligopolistic behavior in a globalizing context. Research conducted by 
Harvey and colleagues (2001) and Law and colleagues (2002) points toward an extensive 
oligopolistic system in and through professional sport franchises. For example, Harvey and 
colleagues (2001) conducted a collective case study of 120 North American major professional 
sport franchises to assess the degree to which these organizations were connected to 
media/entertainment conglomerates. Noting a trend that “Ownership of sports franchises is 
becoming increasingly important to the competitive strategies of media interests as they compete 
for control of delivery infrastructure and media market share” (p. 454), the authors found 
empirical evidence supporting the alleged increasing control of these franchises by complex 
media/entertainment conglomerates. Thus, Harvey and colleagues discussed several implications 
of the “global ‘oligopolisation’ of media/entertainment” (p. 455) in sport, such as the potential of 
an upcoming financial “bubble” due to the rising costs of sport franchises – which may, in turn, 




authors suggested that this process could change the ways in which sport is produced and 
consumed by fans. Noting that an increasing number of sport leagues and events may shift to 
more exclusive, “pay per view” forms of programming, the authors suggested that this process 
“would reduce the range of sport programming available to low income consumers and, on the 
other side, concentrate the sponsorship dollars in these premiere events, which in turn will reduce 
accessibility” (p. 455). Thus, the results of their study has significant implications for the social 
and economic factors of elite sport networks as well as how those networks can impact sport and 
sport fans throughout North America. 
Expanding their scope to a more transnational context, Law and colleagues (2002) 
analyzed the corporate structures of six major media/entertainment conglomerates (Disney, 
News Corp, AOL-Time Warner, Viacom, Bertelsmann AG, and Vivendi-Universal). Drawing 
from Alger’s (1998) five dimensions of understanding and comparing conglomerate structures in 
relation to oligopolistic competition in the media sector (i.e., horizontal integration, vertical 
integration, product and service extension, geographic market extension, and industrial-media 
conglomerate structure forming organizational inter-relations), Law and colleagues (2002) found 
that these companies, often portrayed as separate and competing entities, are comprised of 
various overlapping departments that both compete and cooperate with other organizations 
within the conglomerate: 
What is emerging from our analysis is a picture of distinct, but tangled and differently 
constructed supply chains within which sport is implicated as an element of cultural 
information that gets combined with other icons to accelerate and proliferate its flow 
from source to consumption. In this sense, conglomerates can be viewed as reasonably 




the integrity of the links, but also the relationships between chains that compete in some 
sections and cooperate in others. (p. 298)  
While these findings on a globalizing sport oligopoly are provocative in and of themselves, the 
authors called for more “structured investigation into the impact of such concentration of media 
properties” (p. 300). Though this investigative call was more than fifteen years ago, a dearth of 
literature persists in relation to empirically examining the politics of sporting oligopolies.  
 Overall, while significant advances have been made in sport-management-based network 
studies in recent decades, much of this research has been exploratory and confined to specific 
research settings (e.g., Canada, Norway, public/non-profit sport organizations). Subsequently, 
there is a need to empirically expand this important research domain not only in contexts other 
than those previously studied, but also in ways that may challenge or go against mainstream 
epistemological approaches (Ferkins, Shilbury, & O’Boyle, 2018; Quatman & Chelladurai, 
2008). To fill this gap in the literature, I draw from the elite-white-male dominance system 
framework as outlined by Feagin and Ducey (2017). Missing from even the critical analyses put 
forth by Harvey, Law, and others was an explicit focus on the character structure of the owners 
who operate through the oligopolistic form of organization and how this relates to broader social 
systems. This character and social structure of sport ownership is central to sporting oligopolies 
as it routinely shapes the ways in which policies and practices are also racialized and 
masculinized (see Feagin & Ducey, 2017). Therefore, drawing from Feagin and Ducey (2017) 
serves to further extend the current body of research – both within and beyond the field of sport 







In the context of conducting liberation sociology (see Feagin, Vera, & Ducey, 2015), 
creative developments in research designs and methods are not only applicable; they are often 
necessary for producing emancipatory research. For example, Alfonso Gonzales’ (2013) 
formulation of a neo-Gramscian approach to theory and methods provides insight into how 
essential these developments are when studying political or economic elites. “Neo-Gramscian 
theory,” said Gonzales, “with its focus on power and resistance, requires methods that capture 
both these dynamics” (p. 177). While established methodologies can be useful, Gonzales noted 
the limitation of some of these approaches when addressing elite actors, because “elite actors 
most often make their political decisions behind closed doors and because they have the power to 
determine to whom they grant interviews” (p. 177). Creative innovations in methodology are 
thus necessary at times to adequately address and counter elite white men through the social 
science analysis. Through actively seeking out these creative innovations in the current study, it 
is intended that this articulation contributes to a larger conversation in the field of sport 
management regarding the power and potential of critical qualitative research (e.g., see Shaw & 
Hoeber, 2016; Singer et al., 2019). To answer calls for further development in the use of 
qualitative methods in sport management, I turn to the domain of art from which I draw upon the 
research design of bricolage. 
BRICOLAGE 
The bricolage approach to research constitutes a multimodal form of scholarship (Denzin 




research stems from the writings of Claude Levi-Strauss (1966) referring to the bricoleur as a 
jack-of-all-trades who makes use of whatever tools are available to accomplish a particular task 
(Kincheloe, 2001). Since then, qualitative scholars have drawn from Levi-Strauss’s (1966) 
extensive discussion to conceptualize a bricolage form of research, broadly defined as “a critical, 
multiperspectival, multi-theoretical and multi-methodological approach to inquiry,” with an 
emphasis on the notions of eclecticity, emergent design, flexibility, and plurality (Rogers, 2012, 
p. 1). Since its initial conceptualization as a form of critical qualitative research, much work has 
been done in the further development of the bricolage design (Kincheloe, 2005; Kincheloe, 
McLaren, Steinberg, & Monzó, 2017; Rogers, 2012).  
Though partially responsible for its initial conceptualization, further developments of 
bricolage have continued to emphasize its utility in the context of liberation-based, social science 
research. For example, in their advancement of bricolage research, Kincheloe and colleagues 
(2017) showed how this approach can effectively be conceptualized as both a critical pedagogy 
and “an emancipatory research construct” (p. 244). Concurring on both accounts, Bush and 
Silk’s (2010) formation of physical pedagogic bricolage (PPB) argued that the employment of 
PBB in and through sport studies “challenges the practices imposed under neoliberal ideology… 
one that is characterised by a multiperspectival process and a socially and culturally responsive, 
communitarian, justice-oriented agenda” (p. 561). Thus, in line with these postulations, the 
bricolage design is an appropriate design to be utilized as a social-justice-oriented form of 
research in the sport context – and more specifically, to address the proposed research questions. 
In an earlier development of bricolage, Kincheloe (2005) delineated five core 
dimensions: methodological, theoretical, interpretive, political, and narrative bricolage. 




numerous data-gathering strategies from the interviewing techniques of ethnography, 
historical research methods, discursive and rhetorical analysis of language, semiotic 
analysis of signs, phenomenological analysis of consciousness and intersubjectivity, 
psychoanalytical methods, and Pinarian currere (Pinar, 1994) to textual analysis of 
documents. (p. 335) 
In this sense, bricolage is both interdisciplinary and multi-methodological. Given its embrace of 
eclecticism, however, bricolage scholars have noted that the design is by no means bound by 
these methods, nor are they necessarily to be pre-defined in the research process. As Kincheloe 
and others (2017) noted, “Always respecting the demands of the task as hand, the bricolage, as 
conceptualized here, resists its placement in concrete as it promotes its elasticity” (p. 245). 
Marking a key ontological break from more conventional forms of research, this orientation 
provides methodological flexibility in the construction of social science knowledge (Kincheloe, 
2005). 
 Theoretical bricolage is described as drawing from a wide array of social theoretical 
positions such as critical constructivism, feminism, Marxism, postmodernism, queer theory, and 
more “to situate and determine the purposes, meanings, and uses of the research act” (p. 335). 
Thus, built upon paradigmatic assumptions that there are no objective social truths, theoretical 
bricolage involves drawing from a multitude of orientations to better contextualize and 
understand how one’s use of theory intersects with the political processes of conducting social 
science research. 
 Interpretive bricolage, as outlined by Kincheloe, 
deploys a range of interpretive strategies that emerge from a detailed awareness of the 




bricoleurs work to discern their location in the web of reality in relation to intersecting 
axes of personal history, autobiography, race, socioeconomic class, gender, sexual 
orientation, ethnicity, religion, geographical place, and numerous other dynamics. These 
various perspectives are used to discern the role of self in the interpretive process. This 
process is combined with different perspectives offered by people located in diverse 
locations in the web to widen the hermeneutical circle and to appreciate the diversity of 
perspectives on a particular topic. These perspectives or interpretations are viewed in 
relation to one another and in relation to larger social, cultural, political, economic, 
psychological, and educational structures as well as the social theoretical positions 
previously referenced. In this way the complexity and multidimensionality of the 
interpretive process is comprehended by the bricoleur. (p. 335) 
In other words, interpretive bricolage is concerned with the researcher’s positionality not only in 
relation to a specific research project, but in relation to a broader research context and how the 
self plays a role in the process of knowledge construction. Particularly emphasized here is the 
notion of hermeneutics. As a central point of emphasis in Lincoln and Guba’s (1985) break from 
the positivist tradition of conducting social science, the hermeneutic process accentuates the 
unique positionality of researchers in relation to a complex social world, how one navigates that 
social world, and the knowledge obtained through said navigation. In other words, as human 
beings we have imperfect knowledge which is always changing in relation to contextual realities 
such that new knowledge gleaned in the research process can impact the direction of research 
projects. Thus, bricolage embraces this form of interpretivism noting that a wide array of 




 Political bricolage refers to the inherently political nature of all research. “No science, no 
mode of production,” argued Kincheloe (2005), “is free from the inscriptions of power” (p. 335). 
Thus, bricoleurs aim to develop an acute awareness of how power intersects with data collected 
and the knowledge produced therein. For instance, Kincheloe argued that bricoleurs attempt to 
understand the differential effects of ideological power, hegemonic power, regulatory power, 
coercive power, and many other forms of power on the research product. An explicit focus of 
developing these understandings is an attempt on the researcher’s part to find “ways oppressive 
power can be resisted” (p. 336). As such, bricoleurs embrace a liberative orientation, making 
bricolage an appropriate form of research for doing liberation sociology. 
 Lastly, narrative bricolage involves an understanding of how the production of 
knowledge is shaped by the particular narratives to which an inquiry is privy. According to 
Kincheloe (2005), 
The bricoleur’s knowledge of the frequently unconscious narrative formula at work in the 
representation of the research allows a greater degree of insight into the forces that shape 
the nature of knowledge production. Thus, more complex and sophisticated research 
emerges from the bricolage. (p. 336) 
In this sense, not only does the bricoleur develop an understanding of how these narratives play 
into the construction of knowledge, but this understanding results in a more robust research 
product. To varying degrees and at different stages, bricolage embodies these five dimensions 
outlined by Kincheloe (2005). Accordingly, the research presented here embraces all five 







The collective case study method as outlined by Stake (2005) is employed in order to 
glean insight about the mechanics of the network in question. Collective case studies are similar 
to single case studies, except that in this instance multiple cases are jointly studied to investigate 
a single phenomenon. These individual cases generally manifest some characteristic and can 
ultimately lead to “better understanding, and perhaps better theorizing, about a still larger 
collection of cases” (Stake, 2005, p. 446). As a collective case study, the research presented is 
both intrinsic and instrumental. Stake characterized intrinsic case studies as studies in which the 
researcher seeks to better understand one particular case; a study of intrinsic interest to the 
researcher. Instrumental case studies, however, are employed “to provide insight into an issue or 
to redraw a generalization. The case is of secondary interest, it plays a supportive role, and it 
facilitates our understanding of something else” (p. 445). This case study is intrinsic in the sense 
that the politics of NFL owners are of interest to the researcher; especially in relation to further 
investigating the degree to which these owners shape the League’s structure and function. The 
study is also instrumental in that it is explicitly outlined in relation to the elite-white-male 
dominance system to further explore the political economy of the NFL. Therefore, the study has 
potential to contribute to broader studies on issues relating to power and the intersectional 
politics of domination by a predominantly white male elite. The commingling of these two 
approaches, in conjunction with the collective case study approach, is appropriate for the current 
study as Stake (2005) noted there is “no hard-and-fast line distinguishing intrinsic case study 
from instrumental, but rather a zone of combined purpose” (p. 445). Accordingly, I draw from 
the intersection of these approaches to explicate the extent to which each one provides valuable 




Within this collective case study, the primary method that lends itself to the study is 
content analysis – in addition to other methods that lend themselves to the apprehension of 
ready-made data (e.g., critical interpretivist approaches). Content analysis can be defined as “a 
family of analytic approaches ranging from impressionistic, intuitive, interpretive analyses to 
systematic, strict textual analyses” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1277). Emanating from a 
naturalistic paradigm (see Lincoln & Guba, 1985), Hsieh and Shannon (2005) outlined three 
distinct approaches to conducting content analyses: conventional, directed and summative. The 
authors defined conventional content analysis as generally being used to describe some 
phenomenon, particularly when theory or empirical research on the topic are limited. The 
objective of directed content analysis is “to validate or extend conceptually a theoretical 
framework or theory” (p. 1281), whereas existing theory and research guides research questions 
and data collection/analysis processes. Lastly, summative content analysis is more directly 
associated with the usage of specific terms, and “starts with identifying and quantifying certain 
words or content in text with the purpose of understanding the contextual use of the words or 
content” (p. 1283). In the context of the current study, I primarily draw from Hsieh and 
Shannon’s conceptualization of conventional and directed content analysis. The research draws 
from the directed approach as Feagin and Ducey’s (2017) outlining of the elite-white-male 
dominance system contributes significantly to the overall direction of the study, as embodied by 
its positioning in the main research question. The analysis will be conventional in that the data 
gathered is analyzed in relation to the phenomenon of elite-white-male oligopoly capitalism 
which, while having some theoretical backing in the field of sociology, remains unexplored in 






The cases examined were pulled directly from the 32 ownership groups of NFL 
franchises, extending to direct institutional connections (e.g., politics, finance, technology, 
energy, transportation, education, etc.) to highlight an inter-institutional network (or networks) 
through the NFL as a focal organization. The individual group members were initially pulled 
from each individual team’s official website and then expanded as needed during the 
collection/analysis process. In addition to the 32 ownership groups, NFL Commissioner Roger 
Goodell will also be examined. This inclusion decision was based on the relevant literature 
emphasizing the scope of influence of the Commissioner within the NFL structure (Lentze, 
1995). Overall, these cases provide a sufficient cross-section of a powerful soupçon of mostly 
white men empowered by and through the structure of the NFL. 
Data Collection 
 Data were collected in relation to a broader oligarchic structure and how the critical 
research put forth by Feagin and Ducey (2017) speaks to such data. As Stake (2005) outlined in 
his discussion on case studies, the type of data sought out generally includes (a) the nature of the 
case, especially its activity and functioning; (b) historical background; (c) physical setting; (d) 
economic, political, legal, aesthetic, and other contexts; (e) other cases through which this case is 
recognized; and (f) informants through whom the case can be known. In this process, 
information is gleaned from sources including but not limited to official NFL websites and 
online content, news articles, media interviews, online business assessments, and empirical 
social science research. Background information on ownership groups is compiled to derive how 
and why these individuals got to where they are, their capital networks, and other pertinent 




to begin exploring the extensiveness of elite networks of predominantly white men and the 
social, economic, and political institutions that help to form such networks (Feagin & Ducey, 
2017). Furthermore, this approach has been shown to be an effective method for investigating the 
character of sport owners and how the production of certain social relations are incorporated into 
the political economy (Flint & Eizten, 1987). Data were collected until saturation was reached 
(see Fusch & Ness, 2015), then organized and written into narrative format to corroborate the 
analysis process through which several key themes emerge through the process of thematic 
analysis (Van Manen, 1944). 
Data Analysis 
There are two potential methods for analyzing data in a study of this structure. The first 
method is outlined in Lincoln and Guba’s (1985) discussion of naturalistic inquiry. The other 
applicable analysis process is Van Manen’s (1944) conceptualization of thematic analysis. Based 
on the nature of the data collected and the variety of forms in which it was presented, the process 
of thematic analysis was applied in this study. Van Manen’s (1944) conceptualization of 
thematic analysis is characterized by three specific processes: uncovering thematic aspects in 
lifeworld descriptions, isolating thematic statements, and composing linguistic transformations. 
In relation to the uncovering of lifeworld descriptions, Van Manen (1944) stated the following: 
no conceptual formulation or a single statement can possibly capture the full mystery of 
this experience. So a phenomenological theme is much less a singular statement (concept 
or category) than an actual description of the structure of a lived experience. As such, a 
so-called thematic phrase does not do justice to the fullness of the life of a phenomenon. 
A thematic phrase only serves to point at, to allude to, or to hint at, an aspect of the 




In this sense, I attempt to draw themes from the content analyzed in a way that alludes to the 
various elements of the character structures of NFL ownership groups. As such, my intention is 
not to capture the lived experiences of these owners per se but to draw out descriptive categories 
that apply to multiple actors within the confines of the collective case study and the proposed 
research questions. 
 In discussing the isolation of thematic statements, Van Manen (1944) offered two 
approaches to doing so: the highlighting approach and the line-by-line approach. The former 
refers to the ability to read a text and ascertain what the essential or revealing aspects are, and the 
latter refers to a closer analysis of what each “line” of information has to offer. Though the 
author differentiated between the two approaches, he argued that they should both be used if 
possible, ultimately enabling the researcher to triangulate their analyses “by capturing in singular 
statements the main thrust of the meaning of the themes” (Van Manen, 1944, p. 61). 
 In relation to the composing of linguistic transformations, Van Manen (1944) discussed 
how it is in the interest of conducting trustworthy research to deliberate over the ontological 
implications of language such that the researcher captures the essence of a chosen theme. In this 
sense, a reflection on the researcher’s own subjectivities is warranted as well as the contextual 
limitations of where and when data is originally gathered. The implications of language are 
reflected upon in the context of producing emancipatory work, as embodied by the research 
design more broadly. Throughout thematic analysis, data were triangulated with other sources 
(e.g., online materials, databases, media interviews) to ensure the consistency of interpretation. 
For the purposes of this study, triangulation is defined as “a process of using multiple 




(Stake, 2005, p. 454). Thus, conflicting data were considered and reconciled throughout the 








 In this chapter, themes emanating from the collective case study are discussed in terms of 
NFL ownership groups as a collective unit. The themes that emerged include the following: (a) 
overrepresentation of elite white men; (b) intergenerational transfer of wealth; (c) nepotism; (d) 
inter-institutional representation; (e) political and economic networks; and (f) philanthropy. 
However, before discussing these themes it is important to note unique case-related aspects 
stemming from the data collection and analysis process. There were some major developments 
relating to NFL ownership that have taken place since the outset of this study. Namely, four 
events that directly impacted the structure of NFL ownership were (1) the death of Seattle 
Seahawks owner Paul Allen; (2) the death of Houston Texans owner Robert McNair; (3) the 
death of New Orleans Saints owner Tom Benson; and (4) the sale of the Carolina Panthers from 
Jerry Richardson to David Tepper for $2.275 billion amid sexual and racial harassment 
allegations (Newton, 2018b; Reyes, 2018). Thus, four franchises witnessed transfers of control 
during the processes of data collection and analysis. These, as well as the unique ownership 
structure of the Green Bay Packers, are briefly overviewed here before discussing the themes of 
NFL ownership groups. 
 The four franchises that changed ownership are important to note here because they 
demonstrate NFL ownership as an active process through which significant social, political, and 
economic power is conferred and transferred. However, this active process is not indicative of 
the “free enterprise” ideologies often espoused by elites; rather, the opposite is true. Because the 




¾ rule), these instances present opportunities to either extend current relations or further 
consolidate power. In the case of the Seattle Seahawks, it was widely reported that other owners 
were deliberating over whether they wanted Paul Allen’s sister, Jody Allen, to retain ownership 
of the Seahawks franchise or if they wanted sell it – which, according to sportswriter and NFL 
analyst Ian Rapoport, Jody is set to eventually divest the Seahawks as the executor of Paul’s 
estate (Lewis, 2018; Schlosser, 2018; Vrentas, 2018). Speculated buyers for the Seahawks 
franchise include Steve Ballmer (former Microsoft CEO and owner of the Los Angeles Clippers) 
and Jeff Bezos (founder and CEO of Amazon). Jerry Jones has stated the following about the 
latter: “Someone like that. I’d carry him piggyback to get him to the NFL” (as quoted in Vrentas, 
2018, para. 6). In the case of the Houston Texans, control over the organization is being passed 
to Robert McNair’s son, D. Cal McNair, while Robert’s wife, Janice, maintains ownership stake 
(McClain, 2018). Gayle Benson is succeeding her late husband, Tom Benson, as the owner of the 
New Orleans Saints (and the New Orleans Pelicans) (New Orleans Saints, 2019). Lastly, the sale 
of the Carolina Panthers from Jerry Richardson to David Tepper kept ownership in-house as far 
as NFL ownership. Tepper was previously a minority owner of the Pittsburgh Steelers and was 
unanimously approved to purchase the franchise by the other owners (Associated Press, 2018a; 
Newton, 2018b; Reed, 2018). These four developments, in relation to the themes expounded 
upon below, demonstrate active components of NFL ownership. 
 In addition to the transfers of ownership and/or control, there was one franchise in the 
study that differed from the others in terms of its ownership structure. The Green Bay Packers 
are the only NFL franchise that is publicly owned. This public form of ownership was 
grandfathered in during the 1980s when the League formally eliminated the right to public 




group that functions in place of the owner(s). While this form of ownership is unique compared 
to the other 31 franchises, the Packers are still governed like many, more traditional 
corporations. In fact, the use of a larger-bodied board of directors (over 40 members; Green Bay 
Packers, 2019) to govern the Packers franchise further opens up its governance structure (and by 
affiliation, the League as a whole) to being more deeply embedded within an interlocking 
directorate. In the case of the Packers organizations, a seven-member executive committee runs 
the organization, as elected from among the board. This committee “directs corporate 
management, approves major capital expenditures, establishes broad policy and monitors 
management’s performance in conducting the business and affairs of the corporation” (Green 
Bay Packers, 2019, para. 3). Currently, Mark H. Murphy acts as the elected President and Chief 
Executive Officer of the organization, representing the team at ownership meetings and other 
NFL functions (Green Bay Packers, 2019). These unique, individual case-related aspects were 
considered and integrated into the analysis of NFL ownership groups. 
OVERREPRESENTATION OF ELITE WHITE MEN 
 Among ownership groups, elite white men are significantly overrepresented. According 
to the 2018 Racial and Gender Report Card conducted by Lapchick and colleagues (2019), there 
are currently 2 majority owners of color (Shahid Khan and Kim Pegula) and 6 principal owners 
who are women (Kim Pegula, Martha Ford, Janice McNair, Gayle Benson, Marie DeBartolo 
York, and Jody Allen). Kim Pegula is listed twice here because she is an Asian-American 
woman. All 6 women who currently have principal ownership were either named co-owner 
through a parent, spouse, or sibling, or they have (temporarily) maintained ownership of the 
franchise following the death of father, spouse, or sibling. This is not to diminish the role of 




collusive structure of the NFL because of the ¾ rule or are removed from team operations 
altogether. Thus, these numbers are currently inflated and make the NFL seem less exclusive 
than it really is at the ownership level. Even after assuming an ownership role, some of these 
franchises are still expected to be passed down to a white-male heir (e.g., the grooming of 
William Clay Ford, Jr. to succeed Martha Ford) (see Howard, 2015). Apart from these few 
exceptions, the NFL is largely owned and managed by elite white men. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that this group of mostly white men is monolithic per se. Rather, this elite 
group of predominantly white men is multi-ethnic, interreligious, and they politically range 
anywhere from liberal to conservative. 
 According to Feagin and Ducey (2017), a key aspect of the white male elite is what is 
referred to as multi-ethnic whiteness. This multi-ethnic whiteness is built on an understanding of 
the complex social and historical processes that subsumed certain ethnic groups into being 
categorized as “white.” Thus, multi-ethnic whiteness at the elite level includes, but is not limited 
to, Irish, Anglos, Italians, Jews, and Germans (Feagin & Ducey, 2017). Indeed, these multi-
ethnic facets of whiteness are reflected among NFL ownership: a multi-ethnic, and even 
interreligious, group with ascribed whiteness. Some examples include Pat Bowlen of the Denver 
Broncos being a Catholic white male (Dyrud, 2017); the Rooney family of the Pittsburgh 
Steelers are also Catholic, but of Irish descent (Hoffmann, 2018); Robert Kraft of the New 
England Patriots is a Jewish, white male (Heller, 2019); Stephen Bisciotti of the Baltimore 
Ravens is Italian-American (Palmer, 2018); and Robert McNair of the Houston Texans was often 
described as being a devout Christian (Solomon, 2018). 
 Politically, ownership groups engage at different levels for different reasons. There is not 




Ducey (2017), “There are conflicts within the top rank of the ruling elite that are revealed in 
major institutions, and especially in such realms as politics and corporate competitions” (p. 15). 
For example, owners such as Jerry Jones, Jimmy Haslam, and Robert McNair have almost 
exclusively supported conservative Republican politicians; owners such as Paul Allen and 
Robert Kraft (New England Patriots) support more moderate politicians (Sports Illustrated, 
2018b). However, while there are factions within the elite group, “there is nearly unanimous 
commitment to maintaining the top status of elite white men in the country’s gender, racial, and 
class hierarchies and thus in the overarching elite-white-male dominance system” (Feagin & 
Ducey, 2017, p. 15). Accordingly, near-unanimous commitment to a system that unjustly 
enriches white men of status is reflected within the NFL as a political system. Although there are 
individual political disagreements, the NFL’s Political Action Committee (PAC), Gridiron-PAC, 
represents the interests of all owners and serves to contribute to political causes across the nation 
in the name of each owner. These issues are discussed in more detail in chapter 5. 
The Apex of Intersectionality 
 Of central importance to this theme relating to the overrepresentation of elite white men 
is how and why this matters within the political economy of the NFL. As such, the 
overrepresentation of these men is about more than imbalanced demographical representation. 
NFL ownership groups, and the white male elites within this group more specifically, have 
unique character structures shaped by the roles they play within broader social systems (see Mills 
& Gerth, 1953). Positioned at the apex of intersectional systems of domination, the psychic 
structure (i.e., framing) and resultant behaviors of these elites reproduces colonial politics 
(Feagin & Ducey, 2017). Extending Feagin’s (2013) concept of the white racial frame in the 




understand how the colonizer’s model of the world (see Blaut, 2012) shapes sport as a colonial 
institution. It is this psychic structure stemming from the white male elite that serves as the 
foundation for the colonial stratification of the United States (see Curry, 2015, 2017), as well as 
the political economy of the NFL. Examples of how this plays out through the behaviors of NFL 
owners are discussed below. 
 Perhaps one of the most visible examples of NFL owners perpetuating white racist views 
has been Daniel Snyder’s adamant defense of the “Redskins” name in the midst of continued 
scrutiny, citing the name as a term of honor, respect, and heritage (Brady, 2013b; Burke, 2013). 
When asked by USA Today if he would ever consider changing the name of the team, Snyder 
responded with: “We’ll never change the name. It’s that simple. NEVER – you can use caps” (as 
quoted in Brady, 2013a, para. 4). As one of the most valuable sports franchises in the world 
(O’Halloran, 2018), Snyder’s commitment to the Redskins brand demonstrates the interlocking 
nature of white racism and capitalism (Fenelon, 2016). 
 Another example that briefly received media attention was Robert McNair’s statement 
during a private meeting about players protesting to raise awareness of police violence and 
systemic oppression. In a 2017 meeting among owners plus one allowed adviser, McNair 
commented on the protests: “We can’t have the inmates running the prison” (as quoted in 
Wickersham & Van Natta, 2017, para. 35). According to the initial report, the statement stunned 
some in the room, including Troy Vincent to whom McNair later apologized (Wickersham & 
Van Natta, 2017). Once this statement was publicized, McNair made attempts to alter the 
meaning of his statement (Brinson, 2018); however, his racial gaffe had already shed too much 
light on his views about players. Research from Jane Hill (2009) explains racist gaffes as being 




than mistakes. They are ideological objects representative of internal systems designed to protect 
the white self and reproduce racial domination (Hill, 2009). 
 Another case stems from the recent owner of the Carolina Panthers, Jerry Richardson. At 
least four former Panthers employees received substantial monetary settlements due to 
inappropriate workplace conduct and harassment by Richardson – which included both sexist 
and racist behaviors (Newton 2018a; Wertheim & Bernstein, 2017). In a personal statement to 
the NFL from one of the (unnamed) victims of Richardson’s sexual harassment, the following 
was stated: 
Throughout the many years I was sexually harassed by Jerry Richardson, I always 
believed that there was no one above him, no one whom I could tell, without 
repercussions, what was happening to me. (Sports Illustrated, 2018c, para. 16) 
She would later go on to directly address Richardson in her statement: 
I didn’t know what to do when you started leaving me suggestive handwritten notes, 
insisting that I reply and then destroy the note. I didn’t know what to do when you 
summoned me to your personal office, instructed me to sit in the chair across from you, 
pulled my chair towards you so you could sandwich my legs, which you proceeded to 
rub, between yours. I didn’t know what to do when you called me to your stadium suite 
in the middle of the week so you could take off my shoes, place my legs in your lap and 
rub their entire length, from toes to crotch. I didn’t know what to do when you asked me 
to turn around so you could see how my jeans looked. I didn’t know what to do when you 
brushed my breasts to put my seat belt around me in the front seat of your car. I didn’t 
know what to do when you put your hands on my mouth, for me to kiss them. I didn’t 




 I didn’t know what to do. So, I did what you told me to do. (Sports Illustrated, 
2018c, para. 32-33) 
The woman also provided handwritten notes addressed to her from Richardson – to which his 
attorneys and the Panthers franchise did not respond – including direct instructions of how she 
was to visually present herself along with other sexually suggestive commentary (Sports 
Illustrated, 2018c). The severity of these issues was further compounded by the statements from 
McNair and Jones stating that she “misunderstood” Richardson’s “joking” comments and that 
the NFL needs more men like Richardson (Sports Illustrated, 2018c; Newton, 2018a; Polacek, 
2018). 
 Recently, it was also reported that Robert Kraft was among those named in the ongoing 
investigation of a Jupiter, Florida spa and its connection with a trafficking and prostitution ring 
(Belson, 2019; Chang, 2019; Quinn, 2019; Zamost, 2019). In this investigation, Kraft has been 
charged with two misdemeanor counts of first-degree solicitation of prostitution, of which video 
evidence has been confirmed by prosecutors (Andrew, 2019; Zamost, Kliot, & Fortis, 2019). 
Kraft has since reportedly filed a motion to suppress evidence; specifically, the video evidence 
(Quinn, 2019). While it is not in the scope of this dissertation to speculate on the outcome of this 
investigation for Kraft, nor the spa and its noted ties to Donald Trump (Goggin, 2019), it is 
within the scope of this dissertation to understand Kraft’s alleged involvement as being 
indicative of his character structure. Although virtually all men routinely operate out of a male 
sexist frame (Feagin & Ducey, 2017), elite men white play unique roles because of their social 
positioning as the apex of intersectionality. In other words, their sexist framing along with the 
power and arrogance to act on sexist impulses with little recourse reinforces (white) patriarchal 




than individual deviance. As noted by Dave Aronberg, the State Attorney of Palm Beach County, 
“This is not about lonely old men or victimless crime. This is about enabling a network of 
criminals to traffic women into our country for forced labor and sex” (as quoted in Belson, 
Mather, & Mazzei, 2019, para. 9). Thus, the behaviors of these men actively reproduce a 
political economy based on colonial stratification. 
 There is a particular disposition for NFL ownership in relation to both the character 
structure of individual owners as well as the social structure in which they are embedded. While 
not all of the owners’ actions are as explicit as the actions of others, they are equally bound to 
the system in which they operate. Giddens’ (1984) work on routinization may help clarify this 
particular phenomenon. Giddens (1984) argued that routine, as being “psychologically linked to 
the minimizing of unconscious sources of anxiety, is the predominant form of day-to-day social 
activity… in the enactment of routines agents sustain a sense of ontological security” (p. 12). In 
other words, routine behavior stabilizes individuals’ perception that their world is real (Wallace 
& Wolf, 2006). Thus, owners have a “generalized motivational commitment” (Giddens, 1984, p. 
64) to maintaining routine behaviors, and subsequently, their own security within the NFL. Often 
times, these behavioral routines violate codes of ethics that would otherwise be viewed as 
illegitimate. Yet, for many NFL owners their unique framing and subsequent behaviors are 
routinized, and thus, make up an essential part of the structure of team ownership. Chapters 6 
and 7 further expound upon these issues to connect the character structure of NFL ownership 
(behaviors included) to the (re)production of social structures within a larger political economy. 
INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSFER OF WEALTH 
 The second theme emanating from the data is that of an intergenerational transfer of 




intergenerational transfer of wealth refers to the “intertemporal inheritance of resources, power, 
and privileges” (p. 37) among whites, and especially among white elites. Further developing this 
concept, Feagin (2006) outlined four circles through which this “intergenerational transmission 
of economic, cultural, and social assets” (p. 37) takes place: (a) family (monetary, 
cultural/educational, social networking capital); (b) community (segregated family and 
friendship networks); (c) institutional (supportive economic, political, military, legal, 
educational, and religious institutions); and (d) societal (envelops and protects major institutions 
with white-oriented culture). In the context of NFL ownership, this unjust and intergenerational 
transfer of resources is essential to the current status of individual owners. 
 For instance, some current owners inherited their respective franchises outright. Bill 
Bidwill inherited the Arizona Cardinals from his father (Weinfuss, 2015). While an 
undergraduate at Georgetown University, he was named as a vice president of the Cardinals 
organization which was then owned by Charles Bidwill, Sr., inheriting the team upon his father’s 
passing (Weinfuss, 2015). Virginia McCaskey inherited the Chicago Bears from her father, 
Bears founder George Halas (Harris & Hopkins, 2013; Pompei, 2016); George McCaskey, 
Virginia’s son, currently serves as Chairman of the team (Chicago Bears, 2019). Mike Brown 
inherited the Cincinnati Bengals from his father, Bengals founder Paul Brown (Sports Illustrated, 
2018b). However, not all current owners inherited their franchises from a family member. 
Rather, some owners acquired resources from outside the context of sport and entered into the 
NFL on their own accord. 
 For example, Jerry Jones of the Dallas Cowboys joined his father’s company, Modern 
Security Life Insurance Co., as the Executive Vice President upon graduating from college 




Barron Hilton on more than one occasion in the late-1960s (Horn, 2017), Jones began exploring 
other entrepreneurial activities which would ultimately lead him to form Jones Oil and Land 
Lease at age 25 (McFarlane, 2014). Due to the resources afforded to him through his father’s 
company Jones sought to buy an NFL franchise before ever entering into the oil field on his own 
accord. Moreover, he was able to enter into the oil field and start his own company because of 
these resources transferred to him. 
 Dan Snyder of the Washington Redskins is often considered to be one of the “self-made” 
owners in the League (Washington Redskins, 2019). In 1988, roughly 2 years after dropping out 
of the University of Maryland (ESPN, 2000) Snyder used money from his sister and their father 
to co-found Snyder Communications LP, a marketing firm (Jaffe, 2006). By 1993, the company 
had expanded into a variety of markets bringing in $9 million in revenue that year (Jaffe, 2006). 
In 1996, Snyder (age 32) took his company public becoming the youngest CEO ever at the time 
for a firm listed to the New York Stock Exchange (Muoio, 1997). Throughout Snyder’s early 
business ventures, which included a few failed attempts before Snyder Communications LP took 
off, he had consistent financial support from Mortimer Zuckerman and Fred Drasner (Jaffe, 
2006; Perl, 2002; Schwartzman, 2001). Owing the two money for his earlier failed attempts, 
Snyder gave them stock in his new publicly traded company, which was ultimately valued at 
being worth over $500 million (Jaffe, 2006). As a wealthy businessman, media proprietor, and 
active political participant himself, Mortimer Zuckerman was appointed by George W. Bush to 
the Honorary Delegation to accompany him to Jerusalem for the 60th anniversary of the State of 
Israel in May of 2008 (Office of the Press Secretary, 2008). Fred Drasner is also a wealthy 
business man (the former CEO of several media companies) and a former part-owner of the 




sounding board and has tremendous respect for his business acumen (Schwartzman, 2001). 
According to Schwartzman (2001), Drasner was instrumental in selling the Redskins stadium’s 
naming rights Fred Smith of FredEx. Smith, of course, is also now a minority owner of the 
franchise (Washington Redskins, 2019). Therefore, although Snyder is often positioned as a 
“self-made man,” he had substantial social, economic, and political support from these 
benefactors even throughout his failed business ventures, ultimately vaulting him to the position 
which he occupies today. 
 Consider also the resources afforded to NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell. Roger is the 
son of former U.S. Representative and Senator Charles Ellsworth Goodell Jr. (Lynn, 1987). He 
has four brothers, including Tim Goodell who, according to Bloomberg (2019), is the Senior 
Vice President at Hess Corporation. Roger also has a cousin, Andrew Goodell, who was elected 
to the New York State Assembly in 2010 according to The New York Times (2017). Goodell is 
now married to former Fox News anchor, Jane Skinner (Schefter, 2006). Jane’s father, Samuel 
Skinner, was the White House Chief of Staff and Secretary of Transportation for George H. W. 
Bush. As a politician, Skinner was dubbed the “Master of Disaster” in Washington D.C. because 
of the way he handled the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska, the Eastern airlines strike, a national 
railroad strike, Federal responses to hurricanes and earthquakes, and other natural disasters 
(Gaines, 1997; Garcia, 2017). Following Bush’s loss to Bill Clinton in the 1992 Presidential 
election, Skinner became the president of Commonwealth Edison Co. and its parent company, 
Unicom Corp. (Gaines, 1997). 
 Goodell occupied many positions on his journey up the NFL hierarchy after first joining 
the League in 1982 as an administrative intern (Delevingne, 2014). He interned with the New 




department; was appointed in 1987 by Commissioner Pete Rozelle to be an assistant to the 
president of the American Football Conference, Lamar Hunt; served in various senior executive 
roles under Rozelle’s successor, Paul Tagliabue; and was appointed executive vice president and 
chief operating officer of the NFL in 2001 (Bloomberg, 2006; IMDB, 2019; NPR, 2006; The 
New York Times, 2006). In 2006, Goodell was appointed by NFL owners to be the eighth 
Commissioner of the League (Pro Football Hall of Fame, 2019). However, it is unlikely that 
Goodell’s speedy ascent up the NFL ladder would have taken place had he not been born into 
substantial political, economic, and social capital. Moreover, his familial resources further 
cemented his candidacy as the new Commissioner of the League in 2006 – the year in which Jeb 
Bush was also urged by some NFL owners to become Commissioner of the League (Hohmann, 
2015). 
 While these represent just a few cases, the overwhelming majority of NFL owners 
received similar support in terms of inheritance, social networking, educational resources, 
political access, and/or other institutional support. The only “outlier” for this theme was Shahid 
Khan. Khan, the first ethnic minority owner in the history of the NFL, migrated to the United 
States from Pakistan in 1966. At just 16 years old, he arrived on his own with only $500 to his 
name (CBS, 2012). He worked several menial jobs while attending the University of Illinois and 
around the time of his graduation, Khan went to work for Flex-N-Gate (auto parts manufacturer) 
where he eventually engineered a one-piece truck bumper revolutionizing the manufacturing 
process (Crain Communications, 2017). In 1980, Khan purchased Flex-N-Gate outright (Sanjai, 
Jie, & Lippert, 2016). In a 2012 Forbes article, Khan was referred to as the new face of the NFL 
and the American dream (Solomon, 2012). Much of the narrative surrounding Khan refers to his 




American story (Ganguli, 2011), a convenient ideological axiom afforded by the only owner who 
migrated from outside of the US. Since accomplishing his “dream,” Khan has fit well into the 
economic structure of the NFL, particularly in relation to globalization efforts (discussed in more 
detail in chapter 7). 
NEPOTISM 
 Although intimately related to the previous theme, the theme of nepotism is distinct as it 
relates directly to the actions of current owners and the way they run their respective franchises. 
Keleş, Özkan, and Bezirci (2011) defined nepotism as “an individual’s attainment of recruitment, 
promotion, provision of more favorable working conditions and similar gains irrespective of 
their knowledge, abilities, skills, educational level, and experience but owing to their kinship 
ties” (p. 10). Many scholars have argued that nepotism in general reproduces issues related to 
sexism (Wold & Wennerás, 2001) and ethnocentrism (Mutlu, 2000; Vanhanen, 1999). Thus, in 
organizational contexts this unjust enrichment of family members reproduces power and power 
relations within a political economy. 
 Among NFL franchises, it is not uncommon for owners to designate top executive 
positions to close family members. Although this is how several owners obtained their current 
franchises to begin with, it is also an active practice in the NFL. For example, while Bill Bidwill 
is the majority owner of the Arizona Cardinals, his son (Michael Bidwill) runs much of the 
organization as the teams’ president (Sports Illustrated, 2018b). As the previous owner of the 
Carolina Panthers, Jerry Richardson granted minority ownership stakes to his children (Newton, 
2015). Virginia McCaskey’s sons, Michael and George, have played integral roles in the 
operation of the Bears franchise. In fact, all four individuals who have held the position of 




(Chicago Bears, 2019). Currently, five members of the McCaskey family now sit on the Bears’ 
board of directors (Forbes, 2018). Katie Blackburn, the daughter Cincinnati Bengals owner Mike 
Brown, serves as the team’s Executive Vice President and is set to inherit the franchise along 
with her husband, Troy Brown, who currently serves as Vice President (Curnutte, 2000; Sports 
Illustrated, 2018b). 
According to the official website of the Cowboys (Dallas Cowboys, 2018), the executive 
board of the Cowboys is comprised of Jerry Jones’ three children: Stephen Jones (Chief 
Operating Officer/Executive Vice President/Director of Player Personnel), Charlotte Jones 
Anderson (Executive Vice President/Chief Brand Officer), and Jerry Jones, Jr. (Executive Vice 
President/Chief Sales and Marketing Officer). Serving as Vice Chairs of the Detroit Lions 
franchise are Martha Ford’s four children: Martha Ford Morse, Sheila Ford Hamp, William Clay 
Ford, Jr. (also the Executive Chairman of Ford Motor Company), and Elizabeth Ford Kontulis 
(Detroit Lions, 2018). While Martha is currently the principal owner of the Lions franchise, all 
four children hold smaller shares of the team (Shea, 2014).  
 Shahid Khan’s son, Tony Khan, currently serves as the Senior Vice President of Football 
Technology and Analytics for the Jaguars (Jacksonville Jaguars, 2019). In addition to his 
responsibilities with the Jaguars, he is also a co-owner of Fulham FC (owned by Shahid) and was 
named as Fulham’s Vice Chairman and Director of Football Operations on February 23, 2017 
(Fulham FC, 2019; Jacksonville Jaguars, 2019). This is in addition to his service as General 
Manager and Sporting Director of the club (Fulham FC, 2019).  
 Overall, this organizational form of nepotism was a major theme throughout NFL 
franchises and keeps significant economic, cultural, and political power in the hands of 




which owners were/are embedded. Accordingly, the next theme discussed deals with the inter-
institutional nature of NFL ownership groups. 
INTER-INSTUTIONAL REPRESENTATION 
 Another theme emanating from the data is the inter-institutional representation among 
NFL ownership groups. This theme concurs with Flint and Eitzen’s (1987) finding that a 
significant block of sport team owners emerge from the economic sectors of “communications, 
transportation, real estate and land development, or oil production” (p. 19), while further 
extending their findings in relation to today’s NFL. Current NFL owners represent and have 
extensive connections within and beyond the following industries: sport, politics, education, 
energy/oil and gas, automobile, financial management, transportation/distribution, real 
estate/land development, technology, and media/entertainment. For the purposes of this theme, I 
focus strictly on the backgrounds of the owners themselves and the industries from which they 
emerged and/or currently operate within. This institutional representation provides significant 
resources for the operation of the NFL today, and facilitates an oligopolistic form of capitalism 
in and through the League (see Figure 2 for a limited representation of NFL ownership and the 
institutions in which they are embedded). Although it is important to note that the themes of 
inter-institutional representation and political and economic network are interrelated in practice, I 
discuss these separately to disentangle their nuances. In reality, however, the two are 












 Many NFL owners also own franchises across various sport leagues. For example, Paul 
Allen (late owner of the Seattle Seahawks) was also the majority owner of the Portland 
Trailblazers (NBA) in addition to being part-owner of the Seattle Sounder FC (MLS) (NBA, 
2018). Through their organization, Pegula Sports, and Entertainment, Terry and Kim Pegula of 
the Bills own and operate a variety of sport teams including the Buffalo Sabres of the National 
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Hockey League (NHL), the Buffalo Bandits of the National Lacrosse League (NLL), the 
Rochester Americans of the American Hockey League (AHL), and the Buffalo Beauts of the 
National Women’s Hockey League (NWHL) (Schram, 2017). Stan Kroenke (Los Angeles Rams) 
and assets which he controls also own the Denver Nuggets (NBA), Colorado Avalanche (NHL), 
Colorado Rapids (MLS), and Colorado Mammoth (NLL) (Wagoner, 2018). Moreover, Kroenke 
is 1 of 3 NFL owners who has control over an English Premier League franchise; Arsenal in the 
case of Kroenke, Manchester United for the Glazer family, and Fulham for Khan (Wagoner, 
2018). Arthur Blank of the Atlanta Falcons has ownership stake in Atlanta United FC (MLS) and 
the Georgia Force of the Arena Football League (AFL) (Atlanta United FC, 2019; Hammock, 
2008). Cross-sport ownership is likely a strategic outcome of the resources available to sport 
owners (e.g., facilities, labor, marketing firms, and management), which help to provide 
competitive advantages within the sport industry (see Oliver, 1997). 
 The technology industry is also represented among NFL ownership. Although having 
recently passed away, Paul Allen had emerged from the technology industry as the co-founder of 
Microsoft. While he officially “resigned” from Microsoft in 2000, he stayed on as a senior 
strategy advisor to the Microsoft board of directors and owned roughly 100 million shares of 
stock in the company at the time of his death (Microsoft, 2000; Oster & Bass, 2018). According 
to the NFL Commissioner, Goodell “personally valued Paul's advice on subjects ranging from 
collective bargaining to bringing technology to our game. Our league is better for Paul Allen 
having been a part of it” (as quoted by Henderson, 2018, para. 8, italics added for emphasis). 
Allen played a key role in, and had been a primary beneficiary of, the corporate partnership 
between Microsoft and the NFL. The Microsoft Surface was named as the official laptop of the 




One was named as the official gaming console of the NFL (Sando, 2013). This extensive 
partnership with Microsoft is a primary reason why former Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer is on 
the NFL’s shortlist to take over the Seahawks franchise (Lewis, 2018). 
 Denise DeBartolo York of the San Francisco 49ers significantly represents the real estate 
and land development industries. Her representation stems from both her current work as well as 
the work of her father and brother, Edward DeBartolo Sr. and Edward DeBartolo Jr. Edward 
DeBartolo Sr. founded the Edward J. DeBartolo Corporation following World War II (WWII), 
becoming a pioneer in the post-WWII growth of suburban areas (Bryant, 1994). Specifically, 
DeBartolo amassed wealth by building shopping plazas and malls, but continued to operate 
broadly in the areas of real estate, construction, and land development until his son took over 
upon his passing (Fitzpatrick & Lindeman, 2001). Having amassed significant wealth, DeBartolo 
Sr. purchased the San Francisco 49ers via his corporation in 1977 while naming his son as owner 
and president of the organization (Hartlaub, 2016; Koppett, 1977). As one of the nation’s top 
contractors, DeBartolo Sr. owned 10% of all US shopping malls by the mid-1980s, and this 
number continued to grow until in his death in 1994 (Associated Press, 1994; Crawford, 1986; 
Scardino, 1986). Denise DeBartolo York eventually gained sole ownership of the 49ers franchise 
along with their family’s corporation from her brother in 2000 after the fallout of United States v. 
Edwards, et al., (2002) in which Edward DeBartolo Jr. pled guilty to a felony charge of failing to 
report on his involvement in a racketeering case (Dietz & Arceneaux, 1998). 
 When it comes to building materials, Arthur Blank of the Atlanta Falcons co-founded 
Home Depot (Atlanta Falcons, 2019). Although Blank retired from Home Depot in 2001 
(Terhune, 2001), the Atlanta-based company continued to have an extensive corporate 




viewed as a competitor for Home Depot) has now usurped Home Depot as a leading home-
improvement partner of the NFL (Pasquarelli, 2019). This may seem counter-intuitive to Blank 
having been the co-founder of Home Depot, yet there is more to the story. Namely, Marvin 
Ellison, a former executive at Home Depot (Northrup, 2015), is now the CEO at Lowe’s (Novy-
Williams, 2019). While this type of interlock speaks more directly to the next theme, it stems 
from Blank having previously been on the board at Home Depot. Thus, his personal resources 
within this industry continue to play a significant role in facilitating corporate partnerships in and 
through the NFL. 
 The late Robert McNair (and his son, Cal) and Jerry Jones both emerged out of the 
energy/oil and gas industry. McNair founded Cogen Technologies (energy cogeneration) in the 
early 1980s and hired Cal as one of his first employees (Ganguli, 2012; Poole, 2001). In the late 
1990s, McNair sold three of his power plants to Enron for roughly $1.4 billion while keeping 
two other plants (Poole, 2001). McNair’s connections in the energy industry were central in 
building the Texans partnerships with Reliant and NRG (Poole, 2001; Robertson, 2018). 
However, the impact of these energy companies extended beyond the Texans franchise. For 
example, an editorial publication for the Houston Chronicle (2018) was titled “McNair gave us 
football, and civic energy.” McNair having emerged from the energy industry is seen as having a 
much larger impact on the city of Houston and its surrounding area. Although Jones generated 
significant wealth by working for his father’s insurance company, his work in oil and gas is what 
propelled him to NFL ownership. In the 1970s, Jones founded Jones Oil and Land Lease and 
roughly a decade later he founded Arkoma Production Co. (Joseph, 2018). Jones is still actively 




2018). According to Crowley, Porter, and Collins (2018), Jones now owns roughly 84% of the 
company. 
 Complementary to the energy industry, the transportation/distribution industries are also 
represented by NFL ownership. For example, Jimmy Haslam of the Cleveland Browns owns 
Pilot Flying J, the largest operator of travel centers in North America (Pilot Flying J, 2019). 
Frederick Smith of the Redskins owns FedEx, a multinational delivery service (FedEx, 2019). 
With the Redskins franchise playing their games at FedExField and FedEx being the official 
delivery service of the NFL, Smith has played a key role in, and been a primary beneficiary of, 
these corporate partnerships. Because of the nature of transportation and distribution, these 
companies and their owners depend heavily upon relationship built with oil and gas companies. 
 These examples represent only a portion of the inter-institutional representation among 
owners; this representation is significant for the function of the NFL as well as oligopoly 
capitalism more broadly. For example, the NFL has extensive corporate partnerships with Ford, 
FedEx, Home Depot/Lowe’s, and Microsoft – all companies affiliated with the business ventures 
of NFL owners. For the NFL, and its ownership groups as having interests beyond the NFL, the 
collective of top corporations within various industries facilitates capital exchanges. Similar to 
the function of interlocking directorates in general – and in some cases directly reflective of an 
existing interlock – this collection provides baseline resources for elite factions of corporations 
run substantially by white men. At the core of this are the interests of the individual ownership 
groups. And while their own capital interests are not the only interests empowered in and through 
the NFL, they serve as the lasting core to which other major corporations attach themselves. In 
other words, the inter-institutional representation of ownership groups and the League in general 




Subsequently, the following theme is characterized by the political and economic network of 
NFL owners that extends beyond their own personal resources and helps to better understand this 
enzymatic function. 
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC NETWORK 
 Related to the previous theme is the extensive political and economic network in which 
ownership groups are embedded that extend beyond the NFL. While many owners have 
allegiances to particular organizations in which they have ownership/governance stakes, the 
network as a whole transcends these boundaries. This network is significant in the context of the 
overall functioning of the elite-white-male dominance system “because most of the world’s 
major economic actors are well ‘networked and successfully hooked into… a structured 
framework in interlocking financial and governmental (including supra-national) institutions’” 
(Feagin & Ducey, p. 146). NFL ownership groups have direct access to political and economic 
resources that make them a force to be reckoned with beyond the sport product that is produced 
on the field. Therefore, this theme emphasizes the political and economic relationships of NFL 
owners to better understand the broader network(s) to which they are tied and how these relate to 
the political economy of the League. 
 Although reaching beyond state and national boundaries, the extensive political network 
of NFL owners eventually collapses in the NFL. For example, in the bid-rigging case United 
States v. Climatemp, Inc. (1979), former Colts owner Bob Irsay was represented by former U.S. 
Attorney Samuel Skinner (Swift, 1986). Skinner is the father of former Fox News anchor, Jane 
Skinner, and the father-in-law of the current NFL Commissioner, Roger Goodell (Rosenthal, 
2017). Skinner was appointed to be US Attorney during Gerald Ford’s tenure as President and, 




US Secretary of Transportation (Swift, 1986; Rosenthal, 2017). Further adding to the collapsing 
of these NFL-political relationships, George H. W. Bush consider Robert McNair his “good 
friend” (as quoted by the Associated Press, 2018b, para. 3), and Bush was usually in attendance 
at Texans home games. The son of George H. W. Bush, George W. Bush, was a fraternity 
brother of Redskins minority owner Frederick Smith while they attended Yale – at which the two 
were also members of the Skull and Bones secret society along with John Kerry (Robbins, 2002; 
Sora, 2003).  
 The political relationship with the Bush family continued for Smith through his support 
of former Florida Governor, Jeb Bush (Bloomberg, 2018). Further adding to this interconnection, 
Jeb Bush has stated that in 2006 – during the Presidency of his brother – he considered becoming 
Commissioner of the NFL (Hohmann, 2015). In fact, Jeb had told reporters that he had met with 
Patrick Rooney, the brother of the Steelers owner Dan Rooney, to discuss the job. Jeb had this to 
say about the opportunity to become NFL Commissioner:  
I was encouraged to consider it… There were owners that asked me about it, and it was 
nine months prior to ending my tenure as governor [of Florida]. And to be honest with 
you… I could never have imagined abandoning that job. (as quoted in Hohmann, 2015, 
para. 7) 
During Jeb’s 2016 campaign to win the Republican Presidential nomination, Woody Johnson of 
the Jets served as his campaign’s finance chairman before eventually endorsing Donald J. Trump 
(Borger, 2017). These examples, while striking in and of themselves, were just the beginning. 
For some ownership groups, the political network included direct family members along 
with other elite politicians. According to Sports Illustrated (2018b), Virginia McCaskey of the 




here is that McKenna is the son of Andrew McKenna Sr., a minority owner of the Bears 
franchise (Sports Illustrated, 2018b). In 2010, Jimmy Haslam of the Browns was the Tennessee 
statewide finance chair for his brother, Republican Governor Bill Haslam (Cleveland Browns, 
2018). In May of 2017, Dee Haslam, Jimmy Haslam’s partner, was appointed by Jeb Bush to 
ExcelinEd’s Board of Directors (Cleveland Browns, 2018). Indeed, the Haslams are well-
connected with Republication politicians in general, not just with Jimmy’s brother and Jeb Bush. 
According to Knox News (2016), the Haslams hosted a luncheon during the 2016 presidential 
campaign that included: 
…the nation's Republican governors and large donors to the Republican Governors 
Association at their large home on Lake Erie east of Cleveland. Twenty governors 
attended, including Gov. [Bill] Haslam and [Mike] Pence, who pledged that 'federalism' 
would be a hallmark of a Trump administration… (para. 12) 
As a family, the Haslams supported Trump throughout his presidential campaign and subsequent 
inauguration. For example, Pilot Travel Centers (Jimmy’s company) donated $300,000 to 
Trump’s inaugural committee; whereas Jimmy personally gave $100,000 and Dee donated 
$100,000 (Collins, 2017). 
 Many other NFL ownership groups also have personal and/or professional relationships 
Trump, unrelated to USFL. For instance, Robert Kraft of the Patriots has described his 
relationship with Trump as being “very close” as they’ve shared a friendship for more than two 
decades (DeCosta-Klipa, 2019). In 2017, Kraft stated the following: “Loyalty is important to me, 
and [Trump] has been a wonderful friend” (as quoted in Belson & Shpigel, 2017, para. 23). 
Moreover, Kraft’s relationship with Trump has gone both ways with Trump continuously 




image of Tom Brady to his political advantage (Kusz, 2017; Weems & Kusz, 2019). 
Washington’s ownership group also has a working relationship with Trump. Just days after the 
election of Trump to the office of the President, Frederick Smith met with him to discuss issues 
related to international free-trade (Risher, 2016). 
 Moving beyond relationships with politicians, many owners have had the opportunity to 
personally serve in important public positions. During George W. Bush’s Presidency, it was 
speculated that he would appoint Frederick Smith – his fraternity brother and fellow Bonesman – 
to be his Secretary of Defense (Dao & Schmitt, 2000; Przybyszewski, 2000; US China Business 
Association, 2019). Acknowledging this possibility at the time, US Senator Bill Frist stated the 
following: “I think [Frederick Smith would] make a fine Secretary of Defense” (as quoted in 
Przybyszewski, 2000, para. 2). Although Smith ultimately declined the offer, other owners have 
assumed public office. Noted for his significant political impacts on the state of Pennsylvania, 
Dan Rooney was appointed by President Barack Obama to serve as the United States 
Ambassador to Ireland from 2009-2012 (The Irish Times, 2017). Upon his passing is 2017, 
Rooney’s funeral was attended by many political and economic elites, including both Barack 
Obama and John Kerry (Sanserino & Carswell, 2017). In January of 2017, Woody Johnson was 
nominated by President Donald Trump to become the United States Ambassador to the United 
Kingdom (Borger, 2017). In the context of the elite-white-male dominance system, this 
phenomenon is indicative of the revolving door – which serves to consolidate political and 
economic power as top executives amass millions of dollars through particular laws and 
regulations imposed or dismantled while in office (Feagin & Ducey, 2017). 
 Other political relationships more directly highlight the impact that NFL owners can have 




NFL’s London expansion efforts (Jacksonville Jaguars, 2019). Through his professional 
relationship and friendship with the mayor of London, Sadiq Khan, the two are actively working 
to bring an NFL franchise to the city of London (Khan, 2018) – for which the Jaguars are 
considered the frontrunners. This move would involve privatizing Wembley Stadium and 
subsequently selling the stadium to Khan (DiRocco, 2018). Thus, Khan’s relationship with the 
London mayor is essential to facilitating the necessary public (and private) support to make this 
move happen. In all, these political relationships play an essential function within the operation 
of the NFL, NFL expansion efforts, and international corporate efforts more broadly. For 
example, just days after the election of Donald Trump to the office of the President, Fred Smith 
met with Trump to discuss issues related to international free-trade (Risher, 2016). While it is a 
stretch to say that the NFL played a role in this meeting, the fact that Smith was able to have this 
meeting has implications for the political economy in which the NFL operates. Not only do these 
relationships shape the political economy of the NFL, but they further extend the NFL’s 
influence in shaping public policy more broadly. These issues are discussed in more detail in 
chapter 5. 
 Owners also have significant economic ties that extend beyond their “personal” economic 
interests due to the nature of interlocking directorates and extensive corporate partnerships. For 
example, joining the McCaskeys on the Bears board of directors is Andy McKenna, a chairman 
from McDonald’s, and Patrick Ryan, an American billionaire who has generated most of his 
wealth in the insurance industry (Forbes, 2018). Further adding to the NFL’s interlock, Marvin 
Ellison (the former executive of Home Depot and current CEO of Lowe’s) also serves on the 
governance board at FedEx (FedEx, 2018). An important partnership for the NFL, both 




et al., 2002). For example, the NFL currently has substantial broadcasting partnerships with CBS 
(Littleton, 2019), NBC (Karp, 2017), ESPN (McCarthy, 2019), and Fox (Schad & Perez, 2018), 
as well as DirecTV and Verizon (Statista, 2019). By itself, ESPN’s deal with the NFL to 
broadcast Monday Night Football games is worth a reported $15.2 billion over 10 years 
(McCarthy, 2019). However, as political economy analysis shows, to view these corporate 
partnerships in terms of dollar amounts is a limited perspective on the function of capitalism as a 
sociopolitical institution. Thus, the significance of these political and economic networks for the 
NFL are further discussed and contextualized in chapters 5-7. 
PHILANTHROPY 
 One hundred percent of official team websites extolled the philanthropic virtues of their 
ownership groups. For example, the official website for the Washington Redskins (2019) 
described Dan Snyder as being “one of the Washington area’s most prominent community 
leaders and philanthropists” and the charity foundation he created mobilizes organizational assets 
and corporate partners to impact youth development in the region. His philanthropy work is so 
extensive that it “has even transcended American borders” (Washington Redskins, 2019, para. 
5). The website also discussed the philanthropic activity of the rest of the ownership group 
including Robert Rothman, Dwight C. Schar, and Fred Smith. Jeffrey Lurie of the Philadelphia 
Eagles is described as being “a thoughtful and compassionate philanthropist” (Philadephia 
Eagles, 2019, para. 8). According to the Los Angeles Rams (2019) website, philanthropic 
activities in the greater Los Angeles area will be essential to the mission of the team under 
Kroenke’s leadership. While the emphasis on philanthropy was of significant focus for team 
websites, this theme extends well beyond individual team narratives. In fact, among the 




 Some owners opted to personally discuss their own philanthropic efforts in the media. 
When asked what he hope his legacy would be, Robert Kraft responded stating: 
That I love this community. What we do as a family and what our life is about is building 
bridges, bringing people together… Then, the unique opportunity of what it allows you to 
do philanthropically… and how our charitable foundation can also do that… That no one 
ever loved the community more. In the end, that would sum it up. And our actions speak 
as loud as our words. (as quoted in Reiss, 2019, para. 22-23) 
Whether or not his philanthropic activities speak “as loud as” his alleged involvement with the 
prostitution and trafficking ring in Jupiter, Florida (see McCann, 2019), however, is difficult to 
tell. 
 The philanthropy theme was also explicit in the remembrance of the three owners who 
passed away during the conducting of this study. For example, roughly half of an article from 
ESPN’s Sarah Barshop (2018) on the passing of Robert McNair focused on his philanthropic 
work, whether that was referencing the Texans official statement on losing its “Chief Executive 
Officer and philanthropist” or outlining his donations to universities such as Baylor, Rice, and 
South Carolina. The same is also true in relation to the passing of Paul Allen (Leight & Kreps, 
2018). A separate article from ESPN’s Brady Henderson (2018) similarly emphasized the 
philanthropic efforts of Allen as a man for the people. According to a statement by Roger 
Goodell on the passing of Tom Benson, “he was a generous and caring philanthropist” (as quoted 
in Perez, 2018, para. 6). The re-presentations of the life of these sport owners and business 
moguls as philanthropists appears as if the NFL and the (sporting) media who depend upon the 
political economy of the League have a vested interest in reassuring the legitimacy of its 




 The findings of this study, when viewed through the lens of the elite-white-male 
dominance system, point to the illegitimacy of owner-philanthropy. The mostly white-male 
owners of the NFL are not philanthropic in the abstract sense; but rather, they are individuals 
with particular worldviews, political agendas, and other capital interests. Throughout mediated 
narratives surrounding the philanthropic activity of NFL owners, these depictions rarely – if ever 
– contextualize these individuals as also donating millions of dollars to political campaigns, 
benefitting from substantial tax cuts due to their donations, or other critically important 
information that might serve to delegitimize the otherwise virtuous acts of this white-male elite 
(Feagin, 2013; Feagin & Ducey, 2017). 
Education 
 A significant portion of NFL ownership groups’ philanthropic efforts have taken place 
through institutions of higher education. This form for philanthropy is key because the political 
economy of universities often depends upon these substantial donations from private elites 
(Feagin & Ducey, 2017). In exchange for their donations, elites are often able to sit on or directly 
form advisory committees for the purpose of vetting “proper” candidates for academic programs 
that promote “political economy and free enterprise” (Feagin & Ducey, 2017, p. 82; Hundley, 
2011). Wealthy white donors “run their charitable foundations with the purpose of greatly 
shaping teaching and research in higher education” (Feagin & Ducey, 2017, p. 82). A significant 
practical outcome of this method of pedagogical manipulation is control over the labor force, 
both present and future. For example, not only did the University of Washington’s Paul G. Allen 
School of Computer Science and Engineering grant Paul Allen the ability to shape academic 




 Consider also the efforts of Robert McNair. In return for McNair donating significant 
funds to Baylor, Rice, and South Carolina, his imprint was memorialized at these universities. 
Since 1994, McNair sat on the Board of Trustees for the Baylor College of Medicine; and in 
2007 funding from McNair’s foundation established the McNair Medical Institute “with the 
intention of recruiting talented scientists and physician-scientists from around the world to the 
Texas Medical Center” (Baylor College of Medicine, 2019, para. 5). Robert and Janice McNair 
had this to say about the Institute: “We just think perhaps that this will provide some additional 
impetus to move along discoveries… we are looking forward to producing many medical 
advances and discoveries…” (as quoted in Baylor College of Medicine, 2019, para. 7). At Rice 
University, McNair also served on the Board of Trustees and was a major benefactor to the Jones 
Graduate School of Business as well as the Baker Institute for Public Policy (Ramapriyan, 2018). 
His son, Cal McNair currently serves on the Council of Overseers at the Jones Graduate School 
of Business (Ramapriyan, 2018). The McNairs’s donations to the Baker Institute for Public 
Policy resulted in the establishment of the Janice and Robert McNair Chair in Public Policy. 
According to Edward Djerejian, the current occupant of this position, “[Robert] was truly 
instrumental in shaping the institute into what it is today” (as quoted in Ramapriyan, 2018, para. 
8). At the University of South Carolina, Robert McNair’s benefactorship led to the creation of 
the McNair Scholars program which “provides scholarships to attract the most talented out-of-
state students in the nation” as well as the McNair Institute for Entrepreneurism and Free 
Enterprise (Pastides, 2018). While Allen and McNair represent just two examples, many NFL 
owners are able to actively shape the political economy of institutions of higher education. Thus, 






 The concept of philantro-capitalism is also helpful in understanding the philanthropic 
efforts of ownership groups. Feagin and Ducey’s (2017) discussion of philanthro-capitalism 
emphasizes how this form of philanthropy is essential to elite-white-male dominance. Philanthro-
capitalism “involves mostly white-elite-sponsored nonprofit foundations that apply the ‘business 
logic of profit-making institutions to philanthropic activities’” (Feagin & Ducey, 2017, p. 237). 
These enormous foundations provide elite capitalists with important tax write-offs in the process 
of assisting in the effort to shape national and international social policy (Feagin & Ducey, 
2017). The irony of the NFL’s philanthropy is perhaps most visible in the hundreds of millions 
of dollars that local tax-payers often pay to help fund the very stadiums which local fans will 
then pay to enter (Goodman, 2002). Indeed, this imperial form of philanthropy enables the elite 
to circumvent the democratic process, whereby their seemingly altruistic actions “frequently 
exclude alternative health and welfare possibilities and concentrate supposedly philanthropic 
decisions in elite-controlled hands without substantial local democratic input and decision-
making” (Feagin & Ducey, 2017; p. 238). Thus, philanthro-capitalism plays essential material 
and ideological roles in reproducing elite-white-male dominance. As such, the over-emphasis on 
philanthropy in the mass media when discussing NFL owners is more than dubious; it actively 
serves to buttress the power and control of this group while publicly legitimizing them as being 
“for the people.” This processes of legitimization through a mediated NFL (ownership) are 





THE NFL AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM 
 
 In the following three chapters, I discuss the findings of the collective case study in 
relation to the political economy of the NFL. Specifically, the themes relating to NFL ownership 
are contextualized to better understand the structure and function of the League in contemporary 
society. In doing so, I draw from two primary perspectives for examining sport organizations 
outlined by Slack and Parent (2006): (a) organizations as political systems; and (b) organizations 
as instruments of domination. 
 According to Slack and Parent (2006), few studies in the field of sport management have 
examined sport organizations explicitly as systems of political activity. With some exceptions 
(e.g., Sack & Staurowsky, 1998; Stern, 1979), most of the research in this area has emphasized 
how the political struggles of various groups have manifested in and through sport (Cunningham 
et al., 2019; Hall, Cullen, & Slack, 1989; Kidd, 1988; Macintosh & Whitson, 1990; Sack & 
Kidd, 1985). However, there remains a need to further understand sport organizations themselves 
as systems of political activity, not just contexts in which political struggles take place. 
Accordingly, this chapter focuses on the NFL as a political system through which ownership 
groups exert public influence. 
 In relation to the second perspective discussed by Slack and Parent (2006), 
…organizations are seen as instruments designed to benefit the interests of a privileged 
few at the expense of the masses… organizations (or more accurately their dominant 
coalitions) are seen as exploiting their workers, their host communities, and often the 




While sport management researchers largely avoid this perspective for a myriad of reasons (e.g., 
sources of funding, job security, and pressures for publication in particular journals), it is just as 
essential for understanding sport organizations as are other, more mainstream approaches (Slack 
& Parent, 2006). Existing research that does explore sport organizations as instruments of 
domination generally comes from outside the field of sport management (e.g., sociology of sport 
and critical journalism). For example, several scholars have examined domination in professional 
and intercollegiate athletics (Huizenga, 1994; Manley & Friend, 1992; Telander, 1989); 
governmental exploitation for the purposes of promoting particular ideologies or policies 
(Harvey & Proulx, 1988; Kidd, 1988; Macintosh & Whitson, 1990); and how class-, race-, and 
gender-based exploitation operate in sport organizations (Cashmore, 2005; Gruneau, 1983; 
Whitson & Macintosh, 1989). Therefore, to bring this discussion to the field of sport 
management and to better understand the insights gleaned from such a perspective, the NFL is 
contextualized as a system of domination through which an elite faction of predominantly white 
men consolidate, augment, and legitimize power. The remainder of this chapter focuses 
specifically on the political implications of the NFL and its ownership groups while chapters six 
and seven emphasize more heavily the dominative aspects of the NFL. 
POLITICS OF THE NFL (OWNERSHIP) 
 As embodied by the theme of political and economic network, NFL owners are 
embedded within a nationally and internationally significant political network. Accordingly, this 
section addresses the ways in which organizations and individuals impact public policy to better 
understand the NFL as a political system. The ability for organizations to do so is first addressed 
before emphasizing the political action of NFL owners, both as individuals as well as a collective 




association, one of the primary functions of the League has historically been to impact public 
policy on behalf of its constituents. Therefore, this section further explores the degree(s) to 
which the NFL functions for political purposes. 
 There are various methods organizations and their top managers use to engage as political 
entities. For example, Weidenbaum (1980) argued that “public policy is no longer a ‘spectator 
sport’” (p. 10) for corporate managers. In fact, Weidenbaum’s (1980) focus on breaking away 
from the notion of public policy as a spectator sport came directly from the CEO of General 
Electric (GE) who used those exact words in a meeting with other company officials. Noting 
different approaches to how businesses can engage with public politics (e.g., reactionary, 
anticipatory, active), the author argued that it is in corporations’ best interest to be as politically 
active as possible on multiple fronts: 
Some business firms are making more extensive use of the many existing channels of 
communication that are already available to them in efforts to raise the public awareness 
of political issues that affect the future of the business community. These channels, which 
may currently be devoted to more traditional or operational messages, reach a wide 
variety of "publics": employee newspapers, company magazines, and reports to 
shareholders; materials sent to customers, suppliers, and retired personnel; bulletin boards 
and posters on company premises; and employee training and management development 
programs.  
 It is in the active approach – business involvement in the public arena – that the 
greatest potential for improving business-government relations may lie. The role that 




play in this arena needs to be rethought in a more positive light. (Weidenbaum, 1980, p. 
52, italics added for emphasis) 
Thus, Weidenbaum’s (1980) “strategic” approach to the corporate navigation of public policy 
involved a profusion of ways in which organizations and top managers can actively influence 
public thought and action while circumventing the democratic process. 
 As another example of how corporations can circumvent the democratic-legal process to 
influence attitudes, actions, and norms, Dobbin and Kelly (2007) provided an empirical example 
that drew from an institutional perspective on organizations. In their examination of how 
organizations sought to address sexual harassment problems throughout the late 20th century, the 
authors argued that the professional construction of grievance procedures and training programs 
effectively paved the way for organizations to avoid facing legal backlash to sexual harassment 
via the formation of new institutional norms (Dobbin & Kelly, 2007). Bureaucratizing grievance 
processes and simultaneously circumventing the legal system put a substantial amount of power 
in the hands of corporate executives that, before the professional fabrication of sensitivity 
training programs, was in the hands of the public: 
As the formal organization has absorbed more and more of social life, jurisdictional 
disputes between professional groups increasingly play out before executives rather than 
public officials. Professions win jurisdiction not through state licensure, but by 
popularizing the management practices they favor. (Dobbin & Kelly, 2007, p. 1204) 
In the popularizing of certain management practices, the authors discussed how these programs 
subsequently became the legal standard to which all other organizations operating within the 




executives play key roles in shaping public policy and organizational structure by implementing 
and popularizing emergent managerial practices (Dobbin & Kelly, 2007). 
 Further exploring how corporations “play politics,” legal scholar Jill Fisch (2005) 
conducted a case study on FedEx – the company owned by Washington minority owner Fred 
Smith. Noting that corporate scholars often overlook non-market factors and political scholars 
often overlook the intersection of politics and corporate business strategy, Fisch’s (2005) case 
study demonstrated that “firm competition takes place both in the marketplace and in the 
political arena; the dynamics of one environment affect the other” (Fisch, 2005, p. 1558). 
Specifically, FedEx’s corporate strategy depended upon the deregulation of the air cargo 
industry. However, “although FedEx has generally sought broad-based reforms that benefit the 
entire express carrier industry, each piece of legislation provided particularized benefits to 
FedEx” (Fisch, 2005, p. 1568). Thus, through their “political capital” (p. 1570) – achieved 
through years of campaign funding, advertising, lobbying, and other forms of political activity – 
FedEx gained a competitive advantage over their industry peers. Fisch’s (2005) study is 
significant because it demonstrated the necessity for – and perhaps the normality of – major 
corporations shaping public policy in local, regional, national, and transnational contexts. 
 Impacting public policy has been a central function of sporting institutions (Johnson & 
Frey, 1985). Indeed, Sage (2000) argued that “the major means by which the state has protected 
the investments of professional team owners and has advanced capital accumulation have been 
the courts and Congressional legislation” (p. 266). However, in the case of the NFL, the political 
engagement of ownership groups is not limited to their own private ventures outside of the 
League – as was the case with Smith and FedEx outlined by Fisch (2005). Rather, owners also 




many ownership groups having personal relationships to political elites at various levels they are 
also financially active, having substantial influence on who gets into public office and the 
development of policies the those offices deliberate. For instance, 9 of the 32 majority owners 
collectively contributed over $7.5 million to Donald Trump’s inaugural committee (Berkowitz, 
2017). Out of the $107 million total that was raised by Trump’s inaugural committee, $61 
million was associated with vendors (McCann, 2018). This means that of the $46 million raised 
by non-vendors for Trump’s inaugural committee, over 16% of that total was paid for by 9 NFL 
majority owners; namely, Jimmy Haslam, Jerry Jones, Robert McNair, Shahid Khan, Stan 
Kroenke, Robert Kraft, Woody Johnson, Edward Glazer, and Daniel Snyder. 
 As organized through the structure of the League, NFL ownership also operates through 
its political action committee (PAC), Gridiron-PAC. According to official financial data from the 
Federal Election Commission, team owners, as well as family members and other invested 
groups, actively donate money to Gridiron-PAC which then, in turn, distributes those funds 
among political candidates. Contribution data for Gridiron-PAC in 2016 shows that individual 
donors donating more than $200 each contributed a total of $1,411,130 to the PAC; $625,250 
was distributed among federal candidates in the House of Representatives and the Senate (Center 
for Responsive Politics, n.d.). This form of political activity through PACs is essential to elite-
white-male dominance at the national and international levels (Feagin & Ducey, 2017). Given 
the long history of the unique treatment of professional sport organizations by the legislative 
branch of the United States, the NFL’s political involvement has material outcomes for 
structuring the elite sport industry and beyond. Further adding to this emphasis, the ability to 
shape political landscapes is a staple of how interlocking directorates function (Burris, 2005). 




influence over policy development but also to understand the function of the NFL itself as a 
political system. 
 The NFL’s politics, however, are not unilateral in the sense they impact public policy. It 
is also a reality that the US political system depends heavily upon the strategic operation of the 
NFL. Consider the ways in which the US government interwove itself with the NFL following 
the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11). The designation of Super Bowl XXXVI in 2002 as a 
National Security Special Event (NSSE) and the representation of 5 former US presidents at the 
game marked a key change in the formal relationship between the government and the NFL 
(Weems, 2015). Designating this Super Bowl as a NSSE is significant because it meant that the 
Secret Service, FBI, and other federal, state, and local agencies officially took over the security 
detail for the Super Bowl, while at the same time local police were actively armed with anti-
terror gear with the stipulation of using the gear provided to them (Schimmel, 2011). Since 2002, 
every Super Bowl has been designated as a NSSE and has had significant impact on domestic 
militarization as the Super Bowl is held in a different city each year (Schimmel, 2011, 2012). 
With the surge of post-9/11 white cultural nationalism (Kusz, 2007) and superpatriotism (Parenti, 
2004), the cultural politics of the NFL provided an opportunity to push NFL fans toward 
becoming what Schimmel (2017) referred to as citizen soldiers. The federal government 
capitalized on this opportunity through extensive advertising of the military, nationalistic pre-
game displays (including the addition of having teams on the field for the national anthem), 
selective tellings and re-tellings of US history, and the creation of the NFL’s Salute to Service 
campaign (Becker, 2018; Mangold & Goehring, 2018; Niles, 2017; Ward, 2015; Willingham, 
2017). US political institutions value the NFL as a political system. Therefore, sport management 





 As a preeminent sociocultural institution in the US, the NFL as a political system has 
significant ramifications for local, regional, national, and international politics. This system 
depends heavily upon the character and social structure of ownership groups as it is through their 
interests and worldviews the political economy of the NFL is structured. Because of the 
structuration of this political economy, the NFL plays a key role within the elite-white-male 
dominance system, both domestically and globally. Although some critical sport scholars have 
argued that sport “is peripheral to the survival of a state political system” (Frey & Eitzen, 1991, 
p. 512), I disagree. Rather, because media outlets play central roles in the sociocultural function 
of sport I argue that sport leagues like the NFL are essential survival of the state (as a function of 
elite-white-male dominance). Therefore, to further draw out the importance of a mediated NFL, 
it is necessary to discuss the role of media in producing legitimacy (Herman & Chomsky, 2010) 
– especially in and through the institutional context of sport (Corrigan, 2014; Dart, 2014; Jhally, 
1984, 1989; McChesney, 1989; Wenner, 1998). Therefore, the following chapter contextualizes 
the role of (sporting) media in legitimizing the political economy of the NFL, and of elite-white-








THE MEDIATED NFL AND LEGITIMACY 
 
 The operation of the NFL as a political economy depends heavily upon the corroboration 
of the media to publicly propagate and liquidate its economic, political, and ideological axioms 
(Jhally, 1984, 1989; Wenner, 2002). Therefore, I extend the discussion of the NFL and/as 
political economy by exploring the role of a mediated League. According to Corrigan (2014), the 
political economy of the media is: 
…a theoretical perspective that seeks to understand the inter-relationships of wealth, 
power, and the media and cultural systems in society – including sports and sport media. 
While much of media and communication studies focuses on textual representation and 
reception, political economists situate those processes in relation to broader political, 
economic, and socio-cultural structures of power, particularly class struggle. (p. 43) 
With a grounded understanding of the NFL as a political system, the sporting media is positioned 
here as an essential aspect through which NFL ownership groups and their interests are 
empowered. 
 Team owners themselves are well-versed in the political arts of media. For example, 
referring to his father’s difficulty with the media, Jim Irsay of the Colts stated that his father “had 
a tough time dealing with the media and he didn’t know what it was like to be in the public eye” 
(as quoted in Bogen, 2007, para. 30). Intrinsic to Irsay’s statement is an understanding of the 
media as having a primary role in shaping, at the very least, the personal politics of public 
relations for elite white men in sport. Similarly, Stan Kroenke has been referred to as “Silent 




have demonstrated some variation of a strategic approach to their interactions with the (sporting) 
press, with many electing to avoid public exposure in general. Former Cardinals quarterback 
Carson Palmer attributed much of the Cardinals recent success to the owners of the franchise, 
Bill Bidwill: “It's easy to say it's the head coach or the GM. It's the owner. And you would never 
know it. He doesn't want to be here when the media's here” (quoted in Farmer, 2014, para. 18). 
Stemming from Carson’s statement about Bidwill is a central emphasis on the organizational 
influence of team owners as well as their (non)navigation of the media. Bisciotti of the Ravens 
similarly avoids the media; however, he has been more explicit in doing so with intention. In a 
2006 release of the Baltimore Ravens Fan & Media Guide, Bisciotti alluded to how he prefers to 
keep a low profile: “I have no interest in notoriety, and wouldn’t mind being the least-known 
owner in the NFL” (Baltimore Ravens, 2006, p. 5). Certainly, there are benefits and detriments to 
both engaging and avoiding the media for NFL owners. 
 The focus of this chapter, however, is not necessarily on how the owners do or do not 
navigate the media as individuals. Rather, this chapter emphasizes how the collective venture of 
the NFL navigates, shapes, and is shaped by the broader political economy in which it operates. 
In other words, this chapter revolves around answering two primary questions: (1) what are the 
sociopolitical impacts of the mediated NFL; and (2) what role does the strategic manipulation of 
sporting media play within the politics of elite-white-male dominance? The chapter moves 
toward answering both of these questions by further exploring theoretical and empirical research 
on media and sport within and beyond the field of sport management. 
 Specifically, it is emphasized here how the NFL engages in communicative action (see 
Habermas, 1984; Wallace & Wolf, 1999) in an effort to produce legitimacy. Legitimacy in this 




desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). While legitimacy has long played a prominent 
role in organizational studies, Mizruchi (1996) argued that scholars examining interlocking 
directorates have paid little attention to the concept. Legitimacy, however, serves as a 
cornerstone in the formation of many interlocks (Mizruchi, 1996). Therefore, this chapter further 
explores how legitimacy is manufactured in and through a mediated NFL, as well as how this 
legitimacy relates to oligopolism more broadly. 
THE MEDIATED NFL 
 Elite manipulation of the sport context constitutes one of the more understudied topical 
areas in the academic field of sport management. Though many in the field of sociology of sport 
have examined the uniquely political manipulation of sport, sport events, and sport media (e.g., 
see Coakley, 2015b, 2017; Jackson, 2015; Jhally, 1984, 1989, 2006), there remains a 
fundamental need to address these issues in sport management research. Moreover, there is a 
significant need for detailing and analyzing the global networks of elites who wield political and 
institutional power and the roles that sport organizations play in legitimation processes (Coakley, 
2015b; Law et al., 2002). Contextualizing NFL ownership, however, requires a more 
interdisciplinary lens if one is to examine the extent to which the “old boys’ network” dominates 
a larger political economy. For example, in 1999 News Corporation offered the following 
statement on the far-reaching capabilities of the media conglomerate: 
Around the World, Around the Clock. . . . Virtually every minute of the day, in every 
time zone on the planet, people are watching, reading and interacting with our products. 
We’re reaching people from the moment they wake up until they fall asleep. We give 




world. We enlighten and entertain them with such newspapers as The New York Post and 
The Times as they have breakfast, or take the train to work. We update their stock prices 
and give them the world’s biggest news stories every day through such news channels as 
FOX or Sky News. When they shop for groceries after work, they use our SmartSource 
coupons to cut their family’s food bill. And when they get home in the evening, we’re 
there to entertain them with compelling first-run entertainment on FOX or the day’s 
biggest game on our broadcast, satellite and cable networks. Or the best movies from 
Twentieth Century Fox Film if they want to see a first run movie. Before going to bed, 
we give them the latest news, and then they can crawl into bed with one of our best-
selling novels from HarperCollins. (as quoted in Law et al., 2002, p. 279) 
According to Rupert Murdoch, the owner of News Corp, “sport, with a particular emphasis on 
football, has been his ‘battering ram’ to establish the competitive success of his media 
properties” (as quoted in Law et al., 2002, p. 284). However, in addition to understanding the 
“who” and the “what” in relation to elites’ use of professional football to politically calibrate 
local, regional, national, and transnational publics, scholars must develop an understanding of the 
organizational mechanisms through which these processes take places. Accordingly, for the rest 
of this discussion I turn to the fields of philosophy, sociology, communications, and political 
science in an effort to better understand how elite politics shape, in varying ways, different 
publics in and through the mediated sport context. 
 Social and linguistic philosophy provides much insight into the communicative functions 
of political calibration. Through an extensive examination of history, politics, and bureaucratic 
legitimacy, social theorist Jürgen Habermas was often concerned with the integral role that 




as “a political order’s worthiness to be recognized” (Wallace & Wolf, 1999, p. 177, italics in 
original). Noting the inherent contradictions of modern capitalist ideology – the disappearance of 
competitive capitalism due to the rise of oligopolistic firms and the re-emergence of the state as a 
central actor in liberal capitalism’s development – Habermas turned his attention to the political 
dynamics of communicative action. Habermas’s theory of communicative action can be 
summarized as a belief that “It is through the action of communicating… that society actually 
operates and evolves; this process is encompassed and structured by the actors’ lifeworlds” 
(Wallace & Wolf, 1999, p. 181). Therefore, in the context of the NFL, the character structure of 
NFL owners and their navigation of a broader political economy is essential for contextualizing 
the function of a mediated NFL. 
 As contextualized within societies with asymmetrical power relations where oligopolistic 
groups constrain democratic-public discourse (Habermas 1991), Habermas’s theory of 
communicative action takes on a lugubrious tone. For example, although communicative action 
emphasizes mutual understanding and the co-construction of reality between parties, Habermas 
(1991) also noted the dissolution of (rational) public opinion due to the communicative 
imbalance caused by the rise of late capitalism. In the context of the modernized capitalist-state, 
“public” communication took on a more disproportionate political function favoring those with 
the means to shape public discourse at-large (e.g., media conglomerates). Thus, economic elites 
with access to media outlets gained significant power during the rise of late capitalism. 
Therefore, the power of NFL ownership groups depends heavily upon the political economy of 






Mass Media and the NFL 
 Further exploring the political economy of the mass media, Herman and Chomsky (2010) 
outlined what they referred to as the propaganda model. This model “explains the broad sweep 
of the mainstream media’s behavior and performance by their corporate character and integration 
into the political economy of the dominant economic system” (Herman & Chomsky, 2010, p. 
xii). The specific principles, or “filters,” of the propaganda model include the following: (a) the 
size, concentrated ownership, owner wealth, and profit orientation of the dominant mass-media 
firms; (b) advertising as the primary income source of the mass media; (c) the reliance of the 
media on information provided by government, business, and “experts” funded and approved by 
primary sources and agents of power; (d) “flak” as a means of disciplining the media; and (e) 
“anticommunism” as a national religion and control mechanism. 
In relation to the first filter, Herman and Chomsky (2010) argued that the processes of 
corporate consolidation that took place over the course of the 20th century resulted in a 
considerably more market-oriented media environment in which cross-ownership and control by 
non-media companies has “[opened] the door to the unrestrained commercial use of the 
airwaves” (p. 8). Through this process, the corporatization of the mass media brought controlling 
groups “into close relationships with the mainstream of the corporate community through boards 
of directors and social links” (p. 8). Thus, new oligopolistic groups were born with increasingly 
consolidated media outlets to be used for the dissemination of news products. This consolidation 
trend was mirrored in the sport industry; and specifically, in the structure of NFL ownership 
groups (see Harvey et al., 2001; Law et al., 2002). 
 The burgeoning of advertising practices has also had a significant influence on both the 




companies. “With advertising, the free market does not yield a neutral system in which final 
buyer choice decides. The advertisers’ choices influence media prosperity and survival” (Herman 
& Chomsky, 2010; p. 14). Thus, as the need for advertising revenue increased exponentially in 
recent decades, the need to survive as a capitalistic organization was greatly shaped by these 
advertisers: 
The power of advertisers over television programming stems from the simple fact that 
they buy and pay for the programs – they are the “patrons” who provide the media 
subsidy. As such, the media compete for their patronage, developing specialized staff to 
solicit advertisers and necessarily having to explain how their programs serve advertisers’ 
needs. The choices of these patrons greatly affect the welfare of the media, and the 
patrons become what William Evan calls “normative reference organizations,” whose 
requirements and demands the media must accommodate if they are to succeed. (Herman 
& Chomsky, 2010, p. 16) 
Accordingly, resulting mediated products have increasingly trended toward programs which do 
not interfere with consumption processes (or perhaps more accurately endorse consumption 
processes). As several scholars have shown, this process was mirrored in and through the sport 
industry (Jackson, 2015; Jackson & Andrews, 2004; Jhally, 1984, 1989; Sage, 1990; Wenner, 
1989) 
 As corporations, media conglomerates are dependent upon steady and reliable flows of 
raw news materials. Thus, not being a financially feasible task to deploy reporters everywhere at 
once, media outlets often enter partnerships with other large, bureaucratic organizations 
(government or business) to ensure a steady flow of content. For example, Herman and Chomsky 




The Pentagon… has a public-information service that involves many thousands of 
employees, spending hundreds of millions of dollars every year and dwarfing not only the 
public-information resources of any dissenting individual or group but the aggregate of 
such groups” (p. 19, italics in original). 
In the sport context, these governmental organizations play a central role producing content for 
and sponsoring mediated sport events (Jhally, 1984, 1989). Ultimately, large bureaucracies such 
as governmental organizations and corporations “subsidize the mass media, and gain special 
access by their contribution to reducing the media’s costs of acquiring the raw materials of, and 
producing, news” (Herman & Chomsky, 2010, p. 22, italics in original). 
 According to Herman and Chomsky (2010), “flak” refers to negative responses to media 
programs or statements:  
It may take the form of letters, telegrams, phone calls, petitions, lawsuits, speeches and 
bills before Congress, and other modes of complaint, threat, and punitive action. It may 
be organized centrally or locally, or it may consist of the entirely independent actions of 
individuals. (p. 26) 
Flak can threaten social and political legitimacy, as well as often being a costly burden to take on 
for organizations. Flak can act as a deterrent and is directly and indirectly related to power 
(Herman & Chomsky, 2010). Powerful groups and individuals can also “work on the media 
indirectly by complaining to their own constituencies (stockholder, employees) about the media, 
by generating institutional advertising that does the same, and by funding right-wing monitoring 
or think-tank operations designed to attack the media” (Herman & Chomsky, 2010, p. 26). Given 
the entrenchment of consolidation processes, groups with the ability to “produce” flak often 




institutions upon whom media conglomerates are dependent (e.g., sport) have disproportionate 
political power and influence in the dissemination of “worthy” news. This particular point by 
Herman and Chomsky (2010) is perhaps more pronounced now than ever before with the 
deployment of the phrase “fake news” by Donald Trump and others as a mechanism for 
delegitimizing any information that threatens neoliberal political power (see Allcott & 
Gentzkow; Tandoc, Lim, & Ling, 2018) 
 The final filter of the mass media discussed by Herman and Chomsky (2010) is the 
ideology of anticommunism as a control mechanism. Anticommunist sentiments have largely 
been driven by the elite because communism as the “ultimate evil” threatened the “root of 
[property owners’] class position and superior status” (Herman & Chomsky, 2010, p. 29). The 
over-publicization of the abuses of Communist states contributed significantly to the elevation of 
communism as a point of reference in Western politics and ideology (Herman & Chomsky, 
2010). Given the nebulous nature of the communist ideology in the Western political scene, 
however, it became a weapon to “mobilize the populace against an enemy, and… against 
anybody advocating policies that threaten property interests or support accommodation with 
Communist states and radicalism” (p. 29). Subsequently, the anticommunist trope in Western 
politics helps “fragment the left and labor movements and serves as a political-control 
mechanism” (p. 29). Ultimately, the political framing of an undefined communism allows the 
mass media to control narratives in terms of a dichotomized presentation of complex realities in 
which there is “our side,” the good side, and the “other side,” the side who threatens the very 
foundations of “our side.” In the context of capitalist politics – as embodied by cultural structure 




is intimately related to the current use of anti-socialism as a control mechanism (e.g., see 
Congressman Mo Brook’s proposed anti-socialism resolution; Brooks, 2019). 
 Building onto this important work from Herman and Chomsky (2010), Jason Stanley 
(2015) further unpacked the mechanisms through which propaganda works. Stanley’s (2015) 
contribution to the critical body of literature on propaganda has been significant, especially in the 
areas of language and (political) ideology. In a liberal democracy, Stanley (2015) argued that 
language functions as a mechanism of social control. Built upon the semantics and pragmatics of 
linguistics, Stanley (2015) offered two applicable models of propaganda in a liberal democracy: 
the content model and the expressive model. The content model of propaganda states that “one 
kind of paradigmatic propaganda in a liberal democracy would have a normal at-issue content 
that seems reasonable, and would also have a not-at-issue content that is not reasonable” 
(Stanley, 2015, p. 140). Stanley (2015) elaborated on this point by offering the following in 
relation to the content model of propaganda: 
For example, if someone utters in a political speech in the United States, “There are Jews 
among us,” it expresses a perfectly ordinary at-issue content, one that is in fact true. 
There are Jews in the United States. But it equally clearly conveys the not-at-issue 
content that Jews are the enemy, by suggesting that Jews are enemy invaders distinct 
from the “us” of the polity. (p. 140) 
This content model can be applied to the extensive media coverage of NFL players who decided 
to kneel in peaceful protest of police brutality and systemic oppression (e.g., Bannister, 2018). 
NFL players protesting would be considered normal at-issue content while simultaneously 




 The expressive model of propaganda contends that “propaganda in a liberal democracy 
would have a normal at-issue content that seems reasonable, and would also have a not-at-issue 
effect that would decrease empathy for a group” (Stanley, 2015, p. 140). This differential 
outcome is because words often have direct, not-at-issue, emotional effects. In the context of 
racist language, for example, Hill (2009) noted the importance of “indexicality” (p. 41) - a 
linguistic-cognitive function where seemingly harmless words depend upon contextually based 
inferences to convey racist meanings. Thus, as evident in the linguistic functions of white racism, 
subordinating speech “only works when it is employed by one of the dominant groups in society 
against a negatively privileged group” (Stanley, 2015, p. 146). From a political perspective, this 
type of speech is used strategically by media outlets to frame propaganda as a way to influence 
the (un)conscious construction of “major” political topics such as welfare or healthcare (Stanley, 
2015). This expressive model can also be applied to the demagogical declarations of protesting 
athletes by various NFL team owners as well as the president of the United States (for further 
discussion on these issues, see Weems et al., 2017; Oshiro & Weems, 2019). 
Though these strategies are employed on a macro-scale in an attempt to control and 
constrain publics, Stanley (2015) noted how they are dependent upon the existence of broader 
ideological frames that (mis)inform belief systems: 
Since whether or not discourse is propagandistic depends upon flawed ideological belief, 
the practical possibility of deliberative ideals ultimately rests upon our capacity to be 
sensitive to the effects of flawed ideologies on our own belief system. (p. 176) 
Diverging from David Hume’s psychological meditation on flawed ideological beliefs, Stanley 
(2015) elaborated on what he called “flawed social structures” (p. 179) and their roles in the 




resilient to change precisely because they are connected to social practices and have epistemic 
flaws (Stanley, 2015, p. 180). In other words, social inequality builds flawed beliefs while 
simultaneously comprising the system of knowledge surrounding the flawed beliefs (e.g., see 
Singer, 2005 for a discussion on epistemological racism and the field of sport management). 
Thus, to change flawed beliefs, one must address the social structures of inequality: 
Just as a belief can be ideological in virtue of structural features of society that inhibit its 
revision, so too can an ideology be flawed, because of flawed structural features of 
society that inhibit the rational revision of preexisting false belief, to preserve a desirable 
situation for a privileged group… Structural features of a society are not merely the cause 
of flawed ideology; they also may constitute it (p. 199-200, italics in original). 
Therefore, it is important for sport management scholars to further unpack the flawed social 
structure of the NFL and how this structure (re)articulates flawed ideological beliefs and mis-
interpretations of the field. 
 Further elaborating on this topic, Stanley (2015) discussed two different kinds of flawed 
ideologies: ideologies generally belonging to those with control of resources and the ideological 
beliefs that those without control of resources tend to develop. In a society structured by systems 
of inequality, the imposition of elite ideologies can negatively influence the development of 
proletariat ideologies such that the flawed ideologies of the oppressed “prevent them from 
recognizing their own oppression, or, with less commitment, prevent them from acting so as to 
alleviate their oppression” (p. 231, italics in original). Accordingly, this is why some 
philosophers have argued that the schooling system of a state is a prime example of an 
ideological state apparatus (Althusser, 2006) – institutions functioning as socializing tools of the 




sense, the NFL can be contextualized as a structurally flawed institution which functions to 
maintain systems of inequality upon which its ownership groups heavily depend. 
 Ultimately, the theoretical and empirical research by Herman and Chomsky (2010) and 
Stanley (2015) on propaganda points to the centrality of concepts such as eliteness, social 
systems of inequality, mass media, language, and ideology as tools that significantly shape the 
political, economic, social, and cultural institutions of a society. At the intersection of all of these 
institutions is sport and the (sporting) mass media. As argued by Harvey, Law, and colleagues 
(2001, 2002), the institution of sport – and specifically the NFL – serves as a centralizing 
medium through which power is consolidated in the hands of oligopolistic groups, (political and 
economic) control is increasingly transferred to these groups, and public legitimacy is 
manufactured and ideologically substantiated. Therefore, a mass-mediated NFL consolidates 
power in the hands its ownership groups while serving to legitimate the political economy of the 
League and elite-white-male oligopolism more broadly. 
New Media and the NFL 
 The distinction between “new” and “old” media is a contested topic across disciplines 
(Corrigan, 2014). However, there are some central characteristics that can help to conceptualize 
the possibilities brought forth by new technologies in mediated contexts. For example, the digital 
and interactive nature of new media help distinguish these forms from more traditional media 
relying on analog formats and unilateral relationships (Corrigan, 2014; Rideout & Reddick, 
2001). Another aspect of new media outlets that distinguishes them from the traditional media 
format is that sport audiences have transitioned from consumption to simultaneous consumption 
and production (Mahan & McDaniel, 2006). In recent years sport management scholars have 




 However, this new form of production (i.e., consumer-labor) is increasingly being 
incorporated into the commercial structure of the sports-media-complex (Corrigan, 2014). For 
example, by incorporating NFL fans on social media into the production of a Super Bowl 
commercial, Ann Mukherjee of Frito-Lay’s stated the following: “The No. 1 benefit to 
something like this is that your consumers actually become your billboards… They’re the ones 
who become the ambassadors, who talk about the integrity of the brand” (as quoted in Blair, 
2013, para. 9). Therefore, new media outlets have provided more direct avenues for including 
fans in the production-consumption process while simultaneously exploiting fans’ consumption-
production as a form of labor (Dart, 2014). 
 Still, it should be emphasized that new media has provided opportunities for 
deconstruction broadly (see Derrida, 1997), and social movement more directly (Edwards, 2016). 
With the potential to destabilize control over the discursive structure of the public sphere, new 
media outlets in general have the potential to contribute to more democratic discussion in the 
sport context (Bruce & Hardin, 2014; Butterworth, 2014; Corrigan, 2014).  
 However, as the mediums through which sporting products are distributed to the public 
transform, some sport scholars have emphasized how “new media are reproducing many of the 
issues found in mainstream media and society” (Dart, 2014, p. 536). A critical approach to 
understanding new (sporting) media is important for the field of sport management as 
comprehensive reviews on this area of research have suggested that scholars generally adopt a 
service-dominant logic focused on cultivating relationships among and between brands and 
consumers (Filo, Lock, & Karg, 2015). Therefore, to build a more comprehensive understanding 
of new media in sport I draw upon critical approaches to adequately explore sport as a political 




 According to Dart (2014), “the logical expression of the neoliberal market economy is 
manifesting itself in athletes, sports clubs, sports organizations and sports-related corporations 
rapid adoption and exploitation of new media technology and the increased commodification of 
the sporting experience” (p. 540). As perhaps the most visible example of the commodification 
of the sporting experience – and most representative of the political economy of sport – 
advertising is central to the production of a mediated NFL. Therefore, the following section 
further explores the function of advertising in and through a mediated NFL. Specifically, the 
concern here is the social and political impact of advertising in relation to the NFL as an 
organization, its ownership, and other vested political and economic groups. 
SPORT, ADVERTISING, AND THE NFL 
 A significant portion of NFL broadcasts are dedicated to advertisers/sponsors. On 
average, NFL broadcasts only have roughly 11 minutes of live action play (Biderman, 2010). A 
significant portion of the remaining time left in NFL broadcasts is spent on advertising and/or 
highlighting sponsorship, whether this is done explicitly through commercials and special 
segments or implicitly through televising the general sportscape (see Wakefield, Blodgett, & 
Sloan, 1996). This combined with the increased pressure by corporations to continue to 
commercialize sport broadcasts led Real and Mechikoff (1992) to posit the following: 
The commercialization of sport through advertiser and sponsor financing ensure that the 
fan’s viewing experience itself will be commercialized, with players and products 
inseparably associated. The sports themselves are presented as commodities, and the fan 
becomes not merely a spectator but a consumer feeding on this heavily promoted and 




Still, advertising and sponsorship bring in a significant amount revenue for the NFL, and for elite 
sport organizations broadly (Gratton & Solberg, 2007; Mason, 1999). A 2012 study by Nielsen 
found that TV advertisers spent 23% of their total budgets on reaching audiences through sports 
events (Corrigan, 2014). Indeed, many have argued that this is an essential function of 
contemporary sport events (Gordon, 2014; Mason, 1999; Real & Mechikoff, 1992). But the 
question of “why sport?” remains a compelling topic in the field of sport management.  
  The viscerality of sport and sporting products has been of particular interest in the area of 
sport marketing, where many scholars and practitioners have sought to conceptualize sport’s 
affective components so as to better understand, manage, and optimize consumption processes 
(e.g., Grohs & Reisinger, 2005; Koo, Quarterman, & Flynn, 2006; McDonald, 1991; Meenaghan, 
1991, 2001). Specifically, the research domains of sponsorship and advertising through sport 
have drawn significant attention from sport scholars in relation to sport-consumer affect (e.g., 
Ballouli & Hutchinson, 2013; Cornwell & Humphreys, 2013; Cornwell, Weeks, & Roy, 2005; 
Kim & Kaplanidou, 2014; Pyun & James, 2011; Pyun, Kwon, Chon, & Han, 2012). Advertising 
through sport, as conceptualized here, constitutes a “general concept representing any type of 
advertising (e.g., television or radio commercials, online pop-ups and magazine ads) that uses 
elements of sport, such as athletes, teams, images of sporting events and sporting venues” (Pyun 
et al., 2012, p. 43-44). This broad conceptualization of advertising is significant because whereas 
consumer attitudes towards advertisements in general have become increasingly negative, 
scholars have proposed that sport serves as a medium through which negative attitudes about 
advertising may be mitigated: “While it may not be suitable for all products sport does offer a 
viable platform for many organizations to consider as they strive to elicit positive attitudes 




 Meenaghan’s (2001) conceptualization of the image transfer model seeks to further 
delineate the processes of how positive attitudes can be transferred over to a sponsoring 
organization. In addition to examining the cognitive processes of image transfer, Meenaghan 
(1991) offered a similar perspective as Pyun and James (2011) arguing that sport provides a 
medium through which sponsorship activities may be legitimized. However, from a liberation 
sociology perspective, it is this very notion of the use of sport as a medium for legitimizing 
sponsorship – or the transferring of legitimacy to a sponsoring/advertising organization – that 
warrants further deliberation. What are the social and political impacts of this overall transfer of 
sport-based affinity? What does this mean in the context of the NFL as a political economy? 
Although there is much research in the field of sport management that has explored this topic in 
relation to better understanding consumption processes, there is a significant gap when it comes 
to understanding the sociopolitical impacts the over-management of sport’s “pervasive” nature 
can have, not just on sport consumers but on society more broadly (Newman, 2014). However, 
research on sport from outside the field of sport management can help to fill this gap. 
 In the field of sociology Jay Coakley’s (2015a) concept of the Great Sport Myth (GSM) 
is essential for understanding how and why a mostly white-male elite seeks to manipulate public 
opinion through a mediated NFL. The GSM refers to the mystique of sport as problematized 
through three popular beliefs that stymie critical public dialogue: (1) sport is inherently pure and 
good; (2) the purity and goodness of sport is transferred to those who play or consume it; and (3) 
sport inevitably leads to individual and community development. To varying degrees, these 
interwoven myths about sport lead to evangelistic beliefs in the institution itself; thus, 
reproducing the notion that sport is legitimate as it is and there is no need to study or analyze 




through which colonial politics are disseminated and legitimated (Carrington. 2010; Coakley, 
2015a), though this process is not without resistance (see Edwards, 1969, 2016). However, 
Coakley’s (2015a) analysis could benefit from further deliberation regarding the mechanics of 
the GSM. Why – aside from the abstract notion of ideological (re)production – does sport serve 
as such an effective medium through which legitimacy is conferred? What makes sport an 
effective myth-making site? Existing research on the politics of viscerality may be able to build a 
more complete picture as to why affect makes sport such a politically unique context.  
 In a keynote address given at Duke University, Achille Mbembe (2016) discussed the 
visceral nature of colonialism in his revisitation of the life, work, and philosophy of Frantz 
Fanon. Despite conventional perspectives that often disentangle the macro-world from the micro-
world, Mbembe (2016) made the argument that Fanon’s “macro” work on anti-colonial politics 
was, in fact, one and the same as his “micro” work as a psychiatrist and philosopher of being; the 
primary connection between the two “worlds” being that the lived experience of colonialism 
penetrates the body and becomes, quite literally, a felt reality that represses the true self. This 
connection between the two worlds has been echoed by European scholar, Samo Tomšič (2015). 
In The Capitalist Unconscious, Tomšič (2015) demonstrated how the philosophies of Karl Marx 
and Jacques Lacan addressed the same phenomenon in principal. Whereas Marx was primarily 
concerned with the material impacts of capitalism on a macro-economic scale, Lacan adopted a 
psychoanalytic (i.e., micro) approach to navigating his way through the viscerality of capitalistic 
structures. Ultimately, the connecting of these philosophies shows how macro structures directly 
influence the existential struggle over what it means to be human within a colonial/capitalist 




reciprocal effects of manipulating the (un)conscious. These works further support Stanley’s 
(2015) thesis on the power of flawed social structures. 
 Because of these connections between the macro and micro worlds, Mbembe (2016) 
argued that emotional sites become the primary domains through which the politics of 
colonialism are communicated to various publics. Thus, corroborated by the GSM, sport 
becomes the wings upon which colonialism spreads (Carrington, 2010). Ultimately, colonial 
diffusion through sport penetrates the conscience of the public in ways that many traditional 
forms of mass communication cannot. Stated differently, elite sport organizations serve to 
legitimize colonial enterprise by capitalizing on the sport fan experience. The sport fan 
experience, as a form of “deep play” (Geertz, 1973), “does not exist in a social or institutional 
vacuum. Media technology and commercial advertising serve as constraints that shape the 
aspects of the mythic experience of… major spectator sports” (Real & Mechikoff, 1992, p. 323). 
Indeed, for advertisers the interactive nature of new media actually creates opportunities to 
impose brands on the process of users’ consumption of sporting media (Corrigan, 2012, 2014; 
Meân, 2011). However, because these points help to understand the function of advertising 
in/and a mediated NFL, further exploration is required. That is, the concept of advertising is too 
often offered as an abstraction. 
Demystifying Advertising in the NFL 
 Advertising is a broad term. While it is useful in understanding the intent of corporations 
in a mediated context, discussions about advertising often remove essential actors from the 
equation. Therefore, this section briefly addresses the demystification of advertising in and 




 NFL advertising does not happen in a vacuum; nor are its advertisers disembodied 
capitalists with little-to-no stake in the political economy of the NFL. As the analysis present in 
this study demonstrated, several of the owners’ personal ventures are represented as advertisers 
or sponsors within the League. However, it is not only the direct political and economic interests 
of NFL ownership groups that are enriched through the operation of the League; rather, the body 
of political and economic interests of ownership groups and broader connections are empowered. 
The League functions not only to legitimize social structure within the confines of the NFL, but 
as a legitimizing agent for other owner-affiliated corporations including but not limited to FedEx 
(Fred Smith), Home Depot/Lowe’s (Arthur Blank), Microsoft (Paul Allen), and 
Ford/Bridgestone (Martha Ford). These owner-affiliated companies serve as the capitalistic core 
through which unaffiliated corporations attach themselves, facilitating broader capitalist 
transactions beyond the NFL. Because Flint and Eitzen’s (1987) examination of sport team 
ownership failed to account for this aspect – perhaps due to league policy changes and the 
increased commercialization of the NFL since the 1980s – further deliberation over the 
oligopolistic realities of contemporary NFL advertising/sponsorship is warranted. 
 The political economy of the NFL is most often emphasized in sport management as a 
“brand” (Oriard, 2010). In mediated contexts, however, brands serve as neatly packaged cultural 
products that emanate from political economies (Nauright, 2004). They are representative of the 
context from which they stem. As such, advertisers understand the implications of partnering 
with other brands and capitalizing of brand synergies (Wolfe et al., 2005). In other words, the 
brand of the NFL is valued by advertising companies; its political economy is empowered by 
advertising companies. Resources are poured into the NFL – which functions as a political 




ownership groups – in exchange for market access, financial returns, and legitimacy. But these 
advertising companies are not abstractions. Because the character and social structure of the NFL 
and its ownership groups are dependent upon elite-white-male dominance, advertisers 
necessarily corroborate these political functions. Thus, the overall function of the NFL, because 
of its political economy, serves as a political and economic enzyme for buttressing the power of a 
white male capitalistic elite. The production and circulation of legitimacy in and through a 
mediated NFL marks it as an ideal vehicle for the production and consolidation of power. 
Advertisers are not blind to this; they depend heavily upon this sociopolitical reality and the 
capital resources afforded by the NFL’s interlock: 
Well-positioned and powerful people foster and prey on that faith [in sport] as they use 
the [Great Sport Myth] to camouflage personal interests related to projects in which sport 
is presented as a tool for solving problems and contributing to individual and collective 
development. It’s as if ruling elites had read Gramsci and concluded that sport, more than 
other civil institutions today, appeals to popular tastes in ways that make people gullible 
and subject to political manipulation and control. (Coakley, 2015a, p. 403) 
Thus, a mediated NFL takes on a uniquely political function in the production of legitimacy for 
elite politics. Implications for the (re)production of social relations because of this function are 
further discussed in chapter 7. 
CONCLUSION 
An examination of contemporary professional sport clearly demonstrates the need to 
employ a materialist political economy analysis to allow for the historicity of capitalism 
to be fully contextualized and properly identify where power, control and real interests 




for a greater understanding of power relationships under capitalism and generates the 
fundamental question of “who owns and controls the means and relations of economic 
production and political power?” (Dart, 2014, p. 540-541, italics in original) 
 In 2006, Jim Irsay told the Indianapolis Business Journal the following: “I look at myself 
as a steward. And a good owner always keeps the fans at heart. We want this [the Colts] to be a 
vehicle that pulls this community together” (as quoted in Sports Illustrated, 2018c, para. 6). As 
“stewards” of the community, an examination of what social structures are produced and 
reproduced by the NFL oligopoly is warranted. Given the political functions of the NFL (both as 
a structured organization and a mediated entity), it is important to understand how the 
stewardship of NFL owners is connected to larger systems. Therefore, chapter 7 discusses the 
significance of this “fundamental” question in relation to the main subsystems of the elite-white-
male dominance system. Specifically, the chapter further explores the implications of who 
owners are (i.e., character structure) and how their personal and collective actions relate to 
broader social systems (i.e., social structure). Together, these constitute a fundamental aspect of 








ELITE-WHITE-MALE DOMINANCE AND THE NFL: LEGITIMACY AND SOCIAL 
(RE)PRODUCTION 
 
 Professional sport in the US provides opportunities to impose a sense of sodality through 
an assemblage of cultural values that often has little to do with the people upon whom these 
values are imposed (Nauright, 2004). Through the routine operation and mediation of the NFL, 
these values are normalized and legitimized. At the center of this operation are NFL ownership 
groups whose character structure reproduces its political economy. The rules of personal 
behavior among ownership groups is essential because “those types of rules which are of most 
significance for social theory are locked in the reproduction of institutionalized practices” 
(Giddens, 1984, p. 22). Thus, the material effects of NFL ownership and the mediated NFL 
actively reproduce social, political, and economic systems of domination. Because the 
Eurocentric nature of competitive sport buttresses a Eurocentric structure of being (Real & 
Mechikoff, 1992), systemic forms of oppression are (re)constructed through sporting practices 
(Carrington, 2010). Thus, the political economy of the NFL – through which team ownership 
groups are collectively empowered – actively serves both the ideological and capital interests of 
a predominantly white-male oligopoly. Not only are NFL owners embedded within a broader 
political and economic network, but the strategic function of the NFL serves to legitimize 
oligopolism in and beyond the US. Accordingly, this chapter returns to the foundational 
argument of the elite-white-male dominance system (Feagin & Ducey, 2017) to show how the 




on a broader scale (i.e., the NFL functioning as an instrument of domination; Slack & Parent, 
2006). 
 The chapter accomplishes this task by outlining the socially (re)productive nature of the 
NFL and its ownership groups; particularly in relation to the three main sub-systems of the elite-
white-male dominance system. Indeed, sport is an essential institution for producing and 
reproducing power relations and ideological practices upon which (white-male) capitalist 
ownership necessarily depends (Flint & Eitzen, 1987). Thus, following a discussion on how each 
sub-system of the elite-white-male dominance system is (re)produced, I examine the systemic 
reproduction at-large supported by the oligopolistic nature of the League. The implications of 
this active form of domination are also discussed with reference to a globalized/globalizing NFL. 
The chapter closes by summarizing the overall argument of this research as contextualized 
within the discussion of chapters 5-7. Chapter 8 will then discuss implications for sport 
management research and practice based on these conclusions. 
SOCIAL (RE)PRODUCTION 
 According for Flint and Eitzen (1987), there is “a beneficial outcome of sports to self-
interested owners in the reproduction of social relations that are already to their advantage” (p. 
24). Owners do not necessarily need to explicitly express their own world views on social 
relations as these views result from the practice of the NFL’s relations of production (Flint & 
Eitzen, 1987). Therefore, the classed, raced, and gendered dimensions of the NFL’s political 
economy are discussed here. However, while classism, racism, and sexism are discussed as 
separate systems (due in part to the fragmented nature of academia), it is important to re-
articulate that these systems coalesce to form a single system in the US with differential 




reproducing “each” system, I close with a brief discussion on intersectionality to emphasize that 
the NFL does not operate in a social vacuum; rather, the NFL actively (re)produces the system of 
elite-white-male dominance as a whole. 
 Neo-Marxists tend to use the concept of social reproduction with an emphasis on class 
relations, whereas personal subsistence is mediated by wages and the private ownership of 
production. This mediation is a consequence of a specific, historically determined, capitalist 
relationship between production and the social reproduction of the laboring classes (Picchio, 
1992). While the ideologies of individuality and meritocracy underpin contemporary capitalism, 
Akom (2008) argued that this overemphasis on “Ameritocracy” (p. 207) in Marxist analyses of 
social reproduction significantly masks intersectional forms of oppression and serves to 
reproduce systemic racism by ignoring the social structure of the US. Centralizing racial 
analysis, Feagin (2006) used the concept of social reproduction to provide a comprehensive 
assessment of five typological circles through which systemic racism is reproduced: social 
context, family circle, community circle, institutional circle, and the societal circle (p. 37). The 
social context is characterized as small-group contexts whereby individuals are socialized and 
transmit resources amongst one another. The family circle largely refers to the transmission of 
monetary, cultural/educational, and social networking capital. A community circle creates and 
supports (racially) segregated family and friendship networks. The institutional circle refers to 
the support provided by economic, political, military, legal, educational, and religious 
institutions. And lastly, the societal circle envelops and protects major institutions with a white-
oriented culture. All of these circles collapse in on one another and contribute to the social 




 According to Laslett and Brenner (1989), feminist scholars have used social reproduction 
to refer to “the activities and attitudes, behaviors and emotions, responsibilities and relationships 
directly involved in the maintenance of life on a daily basis, and intergenerationally” (p. 382). 
More recently, feminist uses of the concept have reflected: 
…the increasingly privatised forms of social provisioning and risk that characterise the 
neoliberal moment in the global political economy. In other words, the everyday 
activities of maintaining life and reproducing the next generation are increasingly being 
realised through the unpaid and paid resources of (largely) women as states withdraw 
from public provisioning, with the result that capitalist market relations increasingly 
infiltrate social reproduction. (Bakker, 2007, p. 541) 
Thus, feminist scholars have both critiqued and extended Marxist uses of social reproduction to 
more adequately challenge neoliberalism (Ferguson, 2008; Humphries & Rubery, 1984; Laslett 
& Brenner, 1989; Luxton & Bezanson, 2006). In the context of the current discussion, sentiments 
from each of these perspectives are integrated to grasp the social reproduction of intersecting 
systems; systemic classism (capitalism), systemic racism, and systemic sexism (including 
heterosexism). 
 According to Nauright’s (2004) analysis of the globalizing sport industry, “it is clear that 
the international organization and presentation of sport serves the interests of global, national and 
local elites – the cosmopolitans” (p. 1334). The issue here, however, is not that sport serves to 
further the interests of this elite; rather, who comprises this elite and what social, political, and 
economic factors are (re)produced by the organized structuration on these elites? As the analysis 
presented in the current study has shown, this question of character structure and its connection 




the NFL serves as the vanguard through which this ruling takes places. McKay’s (1995) analysis 
of the political economy of sport found that the liberal positioning of elite sporting brands often 
masked “class, sexual, and racial inequalities at both the local and global levels” (p. 192). 
Therefore, further analysis is warranted to better understand the (re)production of elite-white-
male politics in and through the NFL. For the remainder of this chapter, I focus on the 
(re)production of class, racial, and sexual politics through the medium of the NFL. Operating at 
the confluence of these systemic forms of oppression are the elites who actively shape and 
maintain their (re)production. As such, it is critically important to centralize the character and 
social structure of NFL ownership in any discussion regarding oppression as a lived reality and 
the NFL. 
Capitalism 
Using the concept of political economy to review the first wave research on professional 
sport and new media suggests that emerging media technologies do not present a threat to 
the conventions of the neoliberal marketplace, but rather adds to the commodification of 
professional sport and helps ensure it remains whole capitalist in nature. (Dart, 2014, p. 
541) 
The dominant mode of producing mediated sport products – as characterized by an increasing 
complicity between media conglomerates and the state – tends to forswear democratic 
participation in favor of maintaining and safeguarding neoliberal capitalist structures (Bellamy & 
McChesney, 2011; Dart, 2014). A significant component to the ongoing legitimization of this 
process has been the public relations (PR) efforts of the NFL. 
 In her discussion of the legitimizing effects of sport-based PR, L’Etang (2006) defined 




communications of corporates producing sports goods and services; companies that sponsor 
sporting events; sport used as business networking and ‘PR’; organisations that use sport to 
foster corporate culture” (p. 392). As many transnational corporations have faced resistance to 
globalization processes, sport organizations have been forced to strategically engage with PR to 
manage various aspects relating to their reputation, relationships, ethics, corporate identity and 
culture, community relations, and more (Jackson, 2015). Noting a broader impact of the 
corporate-sport model, L’Etang (2006) argued that corporations and sponsoring organizations 
have “commercial resources that produce structural power beyond the sports world” while also 
providing an arena to “facilitate and cement business networks through the provision of 
opportunities to ‘play’ together” (p. 392, italics added for emphasis). Thus, in this context, PR 
practices in and through the NFL serve to legitimize the structural components of capital 
networks. 
 However, it is more than just PR practices that actively reproduce the politics of 
capitalism. These relations are also foundationally produced by the onto-teleological structure of 
the NFL. In other words, the League exists for the purpose of (re)producing these relations. 
According to Dart (2014), “the logical expression of the neoliberal market economy is 
manifesting itself in athletes, sports clubs, sports organizations and sports-related corporations 
(sic) rapid adoption and exploitation of new media technology and the increased 
commodification of the sporting experience” (p. 540). Thus, the commodification of the NFL 
product is representative of the expression of a larger political economy that further cements 
systemic classism. This process is both material (in the sense of producing social structures) and 
ideological. In a Foucauldian sense, neoliberal politics attempt to render the social domain 




(Markula, 2014; Lemke, 2001, p. 203) – a key ideological axiom of the NFL, and of the 
institution of sport more broadly (Carrington, 2010). Stated differently: “Team owners’ practices 
perpetuate their advantages with the benefit of both a false meritocratic consciousness and an 
ideological sports opiate that maintains cultural traditions, and as such these provide valuable 
security for their capitalist pursuits” (Flint & Eitzen, 1987, p. 24; Hoch, 1972). Thus, the NFL as 
a sporting space serves as an ideal arena for the ideological reproduction of capitalism in the 21st 
century. 
 This process is further compounded by the oligopolistic functions of the NFL. While the 
concept of interlocking directorates is helpful in making sense of these functions, there are key 
differentiations making the NFL’s collusive structure unique that must be considered. While the 
NFL and its ownership groups are embedded within a larger political and economic interlock, 
owners are distinct in the sense that they own or have ownership stake in their own involvements 
with the interlock. Owners do not necessarily represent firms in the abstract sense, but have 
direct interest in the resources and opportunities afforded to interlocks, helping to facilitate the 
(re)production of elite-white-male dominance. While the Green Bay Packers are an exception to 
this idea of individual-corporate ownership, as an organization they are perhaps the most heavily 
interlocked – at least on a local and/or regional level – given the expansive reach of their board. 
Therefore, while the concept of interlocking directorates helps to make sense of certain elements 
of NFL ownership, the concept itself may also be further extended by drawing upon distinctive 
aspects of sport organizational ownership. Still, insights can be gleaned by further understanding 
the function(s) of interlocking directorates in facilitating capitalist reproduction. 
 Early research on interlocking directorates noted the importance of location in facilitating 




top fifteen cities for interlocking directorates, eleven of which currently host NFL teams 
(Philadelphia, Detroit, Cleveland, Los Angeles, Chicago, Pittsburgh, San Francisco, New York, 
Houston, Dallas, and Boston). This locality is likely a key function of the interlock(s) affiliated 
with NFL ownership groups. Past research on sport owners has found that “Their businesses, for 
the most part, are local rather than national. Thus their social and business ties are more likely to 
be local” (Flint & Eitzen, 1987, p. 20). The nature of interlocks necessitates managers’ 
consideration of local communities not only in terms of economic growth but also in terms of 
social and political development (Dooley, 1969). While this dissertation emphasizes the social 
and political aspects of the NFL’s involvement within a broader system, more research is needed 
to further unpack the effect(s) this has on various localities. Yet, while the importance of access 
to these local markets and political resources cannot be overstated, it must also be stressed that 
the NFL and its ownership groups have significantly globalized in the last few decades, blurring 
the boundaries between the local and the (inter)national. 
 Previous research has shown that sport team owners are not necessarily interlocked to the 
same degree as other top corporate executives (Flint & Eitzen, 1987). However, this does not 
mean that their external corporate relationships are any less effective. Rather, the opposite might 
be true according to Granovetter’s (1973) research addressing the importance of weak network 
ties in facilitating information and resources. Interlocks in general should “be interpreted as a 
general resource that facilitates (through any of a number of equivalent channels) the flow of 
communication, monitoring of events, or projection of influence across the larger corporate 
network” (Burris, p. 252). This is important for understanding the NFL’s role within a 
systemically classist context because “athletic labor processes produce and reproduce the 




constitutive parts of the dominant ideology (Flint & Eitzen, 1987, p. 23). Moreover, owners 
themselves do not necessarily have to pursue interlocks in their non-sport businesses (Flint & 
Eitzen, 1987); rather, the unique function of a mediated NFL in legitimizing a larger political 
economy centralizes the NFL as an oligopolistic system onto which others connect to garner 
such legitimacy (i.e., the NFL as enzyme). Still, it is important to further explore other 
dimensions of this political economy not highlighted by Marxian analysis. 
Racism 
 At this point, the ways in which the NFL and its ownership groups responded to peaceful 
player protests of systemic racism must be addressed. For example, despite the pageantry of 
having expressed “solidarity” with players in the wake of Trump’s reference to players by telling 
owners to “get that son of a bitch off the field right now” (as quoted in Graham, 2017), 
owners and ownership groups have been overwhelmingly against the athletes engaging in 
protests since Kaepernick and Reid first knelt in 2016. For example, Eric Reid (2018) recently 
provided more insight into the actual views of owners on player protests throughout this process: 
Y’all remember that players-owners meeting in New York City? So we were brought in 
under the premise that the NFL wanted to use their resources to help the black 
community. We established within the first five minutes of that meeting that we weren’t 
there to negotiate an end to the protest. After about an hour and a half of talking, Bob 
McNair says, “I think the elephant in the room is this protesting.” Terry Pegula follows 
up with “Yeah, I’ve already lost two sponsors for my hockey team. We need to put a 
Band-Aid on this, and we need a black figure-head to do it.”… [Jeffrey] Lurie says, “We 




Bob McNair then says, “Yeah, just make sure you tell your comrades to stop that 
protesting business.” (1:45-2:38, italics added for emphasis) 
As suggested by Reid’s comments about the fixation of several owners over bringing an end to 
the protests, the hypocritical performance of owners on what was named “Choose-your-side 
Sunday” has only been matched by their disdain for substantively dealing with any of the critical 
issues brought forth by Kaepernick, Reid, and others (Oshiro & Weems, 2019). Moreover, the 
statement by Terry Pegula referencing the loss of sponsors further points to the interdependent 
nature of capitalism and systemic racism, as well as the unique positioning of elite white men in 
maintaining these systems. 
 Overall, this type of performance by owners was indicative of what Picca and Feagin 
(2007) referred to as two-faced racism. Two-faced racism discusses the nuanced nature of 
whites’ frontstage and backstage racism: “Much of the overt expression of blatantly racist 
thought, emotions, interpretations, and inclinations has gone backstage – that is, into private 
settings where whites find themselves among other whites” (Picca & Feagin, 2007, p. x). Thus, 
the frontstage/backstage framework is employed to “examine the significantly divergent racial 
performances by white Americans in public (multiracial) and private (all-white) arenas” (p. x). 
Exposed by Eric Reid, the approach taken by McNair, Pegula, Lurie, and other NFL owners in 
the backstage had little to do with their frontstage act of supporting players in the fight against 
systemic oppression. Rather, the opposite is true. Owners fervently sought to develop new policy 
designed specifically to control and/or rout player protests. On these attempts, Oshiro and 
Weems (2019) stated the following:  
Not only did the development of new policies and programs aim to rein in athletes 




CBS) upon the NFL as a political economy further veiled the voices of athletes using 
these mediums to speak out against injustice. This strategic silencing of athlete protests 
had a collateral effect of shaping and constraining public discourse surrounding the fourth 
wave of athlete activism. (para. 7) 
Thus, while this backstage/frontstage performance more explicitly relates to the character 
structure of NFL ownership, these actions actively served to reproduce the racial economy of the 
NFL. 
 The NFL is more firmly rooted in the racial politics of capitalism, however. For example, 
in understanding the business of the NFL as a labor market laboratory (Kahn, 2000), it becomes 
clear that the substantially white-run League is heavily dependent upon the labor of black 
athletes (see Rhoden, 2010) – likely a foundational reason why NFL ownership has no legitimate 
interest in addressing systemic racism. However, this racial disparity extends beyond the athletes 
on the field. Take the 2002 implementation of the Rooney Rule for example – which was 
designed so that NFL teams had to interview at least one minority candidate during the hiring 
process for head coaching vacancies (Collins, 2007). Although on the surface this rule appears 
progressive in that it sought to address racist practices in the hiring process, there are several 
problems with it. Perhaps the most telling of these problems, however, is that the rule is not 
necessarily designed for people of color or women. Kwame Ture’s (formerly Stokely 
Carmichael) 1966 speech on Black Power can further shed light on what is meant here. 
 Discussing the object of US civil rights legislation in the 1960s, Ture stated the 
following: 
I maintain that every civil rights bill in this country was passed for white people, not for 




am a human being. Therefore I have the right to go into any public place. White people 
don’t know that. Every time I tried to go into a public place they stopped me. So some 
boys had to write a bill to tell that white man, "He’s a human being; don’t stop him." That 
bill was for the white man, not for me. I knew I could vote all the time and that it wasn’t 
a privilege but my right. Every time I tried I was shot, killed or jailed, beaten or 
economically deprived. So somebody had to write a bill to tell white people, "When a 
black man comes to vote, don’t bother him." That bill was for white people. I know I can 
live anyplace I want to live. It is white people across this country who are incapable of 
allowing me to live where I want. You need a civil rights bill, not me. (Carmichael, 1966, 
para. 5) 
In this sense, the Rooney Rule was not passed for racial or gender minorities; the rule was passed 
for white executives (Weems et al., 2017). It was implemented as a road block to curtail the 
actively racist hiring practices in the NFL that had been going on since the formation of the 
League. Moreover, although the rule only applies to the head coaching position out of the 
plethora of other jobs available, the NFL and sporting media more broadly have celebrated the 
“progressive” rule as leading the way in the push for diversity and inclusion in elite sport 
organizations (NFL, 2018). This PR side of this form of corporate social responsibility serves to 
consolidate and reproduce power relations (Banerjee, 2008), particularly in a neoliberal sporting 
context (Weems et al., 2017). Accordingly, it can also be stated that these explicitly racialized 
functions of the NFL – most visibly manifested in the owner-player dichotomy – actively serve 







 The institution of sport has also been central in the reproduction of systemic sexism. The 
NFL in particular has held a more-than-dubious role in the glorification of the masculine while 
simultaneously marginalizing women by placing them in expressive, supporting roles, 
ideological production, and/or relegating women’s sports to a secondary status (Frey & Eitzen, 
1991; Hall, 1988; Kidd, 2013; McKay, Messner, & Sabo, 2000; Messner, 1988, 2010; Sage, 
1990). As a result, “Sport has been… largely a ‘male preserve’ supported by institutional 
practices of discrimination against women” (Frey & Eitzen, 1991, p. 516). While it is not in the 
scope of this dissertation to comprehensively detail the role of the NFL in US gender politics, the 
role of NFL ownership groups in reproducing this overarching, gendered political economy is 
emphasized. Specifically, I focus on how the character structure of NFL ownership manifests 
personally and professionally to directly shape these practices. 
 According to the 2018 Racial and Gender Report Card conducted by Richard Lapchick 
and colleagues (2019), the NFL was given a grade of “C” for its gender hiring practices with 
women being “seriously under-represented in significant decision-making positions at the team 
level” (Lapchick et al., 2019, p. 1). However, hiring practices do not tell the full story. Take 
Acker’s (1990) critique of the over-emphasis on putting bodies into an existing structure, for 
example. It is not enough to “include” people into a pre-existing structure founded on the 
assumptions of a white male elite. Real progress does not come until these previously (and 
currently, in the case of the NFL and women) excluded “others” are included in the formation of 
equitable structures, policies, and practices that impact daily life. In other words, even if the NFL 




changed. This point if key because it is this gendered organizational structure (see Acker, 1990) 
that defines the NFL and/as a gendered political economy. 
 Historically, the NFL has functioned as a systemically sexist political economy. This is 
perhaps most visible in the labor of NFL cheerleaders and its devaluation by the NFL (Harke, 
2015). Despite the fact that being an NFL cheerleader requires the commitment of a full-time 
job, cheerleaders are not adequately compensated for this labor. For example, legal research has 
pointed to the failure of the NFL to compensate cheerleaders for practices and outside 
appearances – of which there are many (McGee, 2016). Because of this, cheerleaders have 
sought to unionize and fight the NFL for better wages (Harke, 2015; Neal, 2018; Pilon, 2017). 
However, it is not just the on-field cheerleaders that contribute to these sexist practices. 
 Many teams also have what are referred to as “alternative” cheerleaders, who are hired 
models in the stands “whose primary task is to charm spectators at the game” (Macur, 2018, 
para. 5). Noted teams that use these alternative cheerleaders include the Texans, Patriots, Saints, 
and Redskins (Macur, 2018). However, the use of these cheerleaders extends further. For 
example, the Reskins “ambassadors” as they are called are used to promote executive suite sales 
(Macur, 2018). This venture by the team went well beyond promotional material, however. 
Dennis Greene, the former president of business operations for the Redskins was forced to resign 
after his involvement with exploiting this group of women surfaced (Carroll, 2018; Kolur, 2018). 
In 2013, Greene invited the Redskins cheerleaders on a trip to Costa Rica with other (all-male) 
sponsors and suite holders, where the women were allegedly required to partake in a topless 
photo shoot and chosen to be personal escorts (Kolur, 2018). Furthermore, it was reported that 
the Redskins cheerleaders were used for entertainment at what has been described as an 




event, white male elites from all around the D.C. area gathered to indulge themselves in a night 
of debauchery. According to D.C. Boxing Commissioner Jeff Gildenhorn, the event was “a 
boxing fan’s dream and a married man’s fantasy” (as quoted in Roberts, 2018, para. 8). Another 
attendee stated it more bluntly: “It’s so great because it’s sexist” (as quoted in Roberts, 2018, 
para. 9, italics added for emphasis). At the center of this event was the exploitation of the 
Redskins cheerleaders, both as sexualized objects for the enjoyment of these male elites as well 
as an exploited labor force in general. 
 The political economy of the NFL is one that actively reinforces the supremacy of a 
white male elite, both as an ideology as well as a social and political practice. This patriarchal 
production is predicated on a heteronormative center that characterizes systemic sexism. The 
NFL goes beyond the hyper-masculine, heterosexist ideology embodied by professional football. 
For example, according to Katherine Driessen (2015) of the Houston Chronicle, Robert McNair 
donated $10,000 in efforts to repeal Houston’s LGBT-inclusive human rights ordinance ( see 
also Browning, 2015). Acts like these structurally reproduce heterosexism as a substantive 
component of systemic sexism. Thus, the political economy of the NFL serves to buttress these 
structurations as guided by the character structures of NFL ownership groups. 
SYSTEMIC (RE)PRODUCTION AND THE NFL 
 The social reproduction of the political economy of the NFL actively serves to fortify 
broader systems of dominance. This reproduction is fueled by the character structure of NFL 
ownership groups and the broad-spanning networks. Embodying an enzymatic function, the NFL 
and its ownership groups are deeply embedded in the politics of intersectional domination. 




and systemic sexism to understand how the League impacts elite-white-male dominance on both 
a national and international scale. 
Neoliberalism, Intersectionality, and Elite-White-Male Dominance 
 Several works have pointed toward how neoliberal practices co-determine systemic forms 
of classism, racism, and sexism (Collins & Bilge, 2016; Ferguson, 2008). For example, Omi and 
Winant (2014) argued that the class politics of neoliberalism are effectively a “racial project” 
(p.211): 
Neoliberalism was at its core a racial project as much as a capitalist accumulation project. 
Its central racial component was colorblind racial ideology. The hegemony of neoliberal 
economics is matched and underwritten by the racial hegemony of colorblindness. (p. 
211). 
While Omi and Winant laid out a persuasive argument for neoliberalism as a racial project in 
their book, Racial Formation in the United States, Collins and Bilge (2016) demonstrated how 
neoliberalism disproportionately effects women of color on a global scale. In discussing the 
effects of neoliberalism on social protests, for example, Collins and Bilge (2016) noted the 
development of the “police state” (p. 138) as a response to social and political unrest. In the 
development of the police state as a response to these movements, Collins and Bilge pointed to 
several empirical examples that demonstrated how “the coercive turn taken by neoliberal states 
has fallen heavily on populations who are disadvantaged by race, class, gender, sexuality, 
disability, religion, and migration status” (p. 150). Thus, it is imperative to understand how 
intersecting social systems are (re)produced as commingled forces. As a Eurocentric and hyper-
masculine organization, the NFL serves as a primary institution for the social reproduction of 




years, it is imperative to understand how the neoliberal politics of NFL owners are exported 
through the structure of the League. 
Globalized NFL 
 In recent years, the NFL has continued its efforts to globalize as a brand. This has been 
most typified by the reoccurrence of games being held outside of the US in places such as 
Mexico City and London (Bravo, Lee, & García-Gonzalez, 2016; Scott, 2017). Due to the inter-
institutional nature of NFL ownership groups and the broader political and economic 
connections, the political economy of the NFL has local, national, and transnational implications. 
For example, in 2016 Shahid Khan committed to a $95 million investment to bring Flex-N-Gate 
to the city of Detroit to supply Ford Motor Co., due in large part to his personal connection with 
Ford’s Executive Chairman Bill Ford (Snavely, 2016). Moreover, Khan’s international business 
connections via the auto industry have provided access to other international markets (e.g., 
Canada, France, Spain, Germany, Argentina, and Japan) that were perhaps unavailable to NFL 
owners otherwise (Jacksonville Jaguars, 2019; Sanjai, Jie, & Lippert, 2016). Through individuals 
such as Khan other NFL ownership groups have direct access to a global market.  
 The global implications of NFL ownership groups extend beyond purely economic 
interests, however. Many owners also have significant interests in global politics. For example, 
several owners (e.g., Robert Kraft and Jim Irsay) substantially support the state of Israel to the 
point where they make efforts to privately and publicly support Israel. For example, Kraft has 
stated that his company, International Forest Products, produced the materials used to package 
the Patriot missile (Information Cradle, 2019) – which had been used extensively by the US 
military in their occupation of the Middle East (Ahronheim, 2018; Bahgat, 2006). Given the 




2008), the international interests of owners like Kraft warrant concern. At large, the globalization 
of the NFL depends upon the exportation of the politics of elite-white-male dominance. Future 
research should further examine the global implications of this political-economic positioning 
and how these effect the colonial aims of the NFL in the context of a globalizing League. 
CONCLUSION 
 In sum, ownership groups of the NFL occupy a central position for elite-white-male 
oligopolism within the United States. As the controlling body of the NFL, ownership groups 
collectively function to facilitate the active process of intersectional domination. Specifically, 
through the NFL as a political system and the mass-mediated NFL, the politics of elite-white-
male domination are (re)produced. In relation to the system of capitalism, the NFL functions as a 
medium through which economic power is consolidated, normalized, and legitimized. As 
billionaire capitalists whose socioeconomic statuses depend heavily upon the colonial 
stratification the American society, NFL ownership groups and associated political and economic 
elites have significant capital interest in shaping, maintaining, and validating the cultural, 
ideological, and material production of the NFL. This colonial stratification is significantly 
racialized and gendered, actively reproducing the politics of social structures outlined in Elite 






IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
 The NFL and its ownership groups occupy unique positions in the politics of elite-white-
male domination. As empowered through the organizational structure of the NFL, this study 
uncovered several themes associated with team ownership: (a) overrepresentation of elite white 
men, (b) intergenerational transfer of wealth, (c) nepotism, (d) inter-institutional representation 
among ownership groups, (e) political and economic network, and (f) philanthropy. The 
interrelation of these themes point to the centrality of NFL ownership within a broader political 
economy that serves to (re)produce elite-white-male dominance (see Feagin & Ducey, 2017). 
While the field of sport management has been largely complicit in the overall neoliberalization 
of the field (Newman, 2014), the understanding of the NFL and its ownership groups presented 
in this study provides scholars and practitioners with a set of options moving forward. Adopting 
a realism approach to neoliberal organizational trends, McChesney and Nichols (2016) argued 
the following: 
This is reality. But it is not a reality that discredits utopian dreams or confirms dystopian 
cynicism. Rather, it is a reality that demands that Americans adjust their thinking about 
democracy… It is pointless to be against progress. The point is to shape progress, not as 
customers or consumers, not as clicks to be counted or employees struggling to synch 
ourselves into automated workplaces, but as citizens engaged in a democratic process of 
organizing a new economy that reflects our values and our needs. (p. 8) 
Following McChesney and Nichols (2016), this chapter outlines theoretical and practical 




 While I outline implications for the field emanating from the current study, it should be 
emphasized that all research is limited to an extent (Price & Murnan, 2004; Shipman, 2014). For 
example, one limitation to conducting case studies that researchers often encounter is that there 
is too much data for easy analysis (Hodkinson & Hodkinson, 2001). While thematic saturation 
was reached in relation to the established frameworks key decisions were made regarding, first 
and foremost, what counts as data in the context of the study (see Denzin & Giardina, 2015). 
Secondly, there were other avenues that could have been explored to create a more 
comprehensive analysis of sport team ownership (e.g., financial impacts of oligopolistic 
activity); however, not all of these avenues readily applied to the focus of the study. Therefore, 
future studies on sport team ownership should continue explicating the multitude of facets that 
shape team ownership and league structure. 
 Another limitation of this study is that I did not necessarily focus on the extant resistance 
to NFL ownership groups, and to the political economy of the NFL more broadly. Domination of 
any form does not take place without resistance (Feagin & Ducey, 2017). Indeed, the exercise of 
power is a dialectic process (DeMaria, 1983), especially in the context of complex organizations 
(Benson, 1977; Mumby, 1988; Zeitz, 1980). Thus, while I briefly touched on instances of 
resistance to further elucidate the role(s) of team owners, a more sustained analysis of resistance 
and its many forms is warranted. While these are noteworthy limitations, the study was 
simultaneously strengthened by this overall approach. For example, case studies help scholars (a) 
understand complex inter-relationships, (b) explore the unexpected and unusual, (c) identify key 
processes that take place within relationships, and (d) facilitate rich conceptual and theoretical 
development (Hodkinson & Hodkinson, 2001). Therefore, it is with this understanding that I 




IMPLICATIONS FOR SPORT RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 
 There are several implications for both the study and practice of sport management that 
stem from this collective case study. These implications include, but certainly are not limited to, 
the following: (a) diversity, inclusion, and social justice in sport organizations, (b) ownership in 
sports, (c) critical qualitative research, (d) and resistance in, through, and to the NFL. Each of 
these implications are discussed in more detail below with the explicit aim of producing 
emancipatory research (see Feagin, Vera, & Ducey, 2015). 
Diversity, Inclusion, and Social Justice 
 As this study relates to the bourgeoning topics of diversity, inclusion, and social justice in 
sport management research, three new avenues are proposed: (1) the application of political 
economy analysis to issues of diversity and inclusion; (2) a realism perspective on sport 
organizational structure; and (3) a sustained focus on the sport industry’s elite and how they 
actively maintain organizational cultures of similarity (see Doherty & Chelladurai, 1999; Weems 
et al., 2017). Each of these avenues can assist in the production of more legitimate social justice 
work in the field of sport management. 
 It is, first and foremost, argued here that sport management scholarship on diversity and 
inclusion can benefit significantly from further analysis of the political economy of professional 
sport. Despite the (white-male) capitalist foundation of professional sporting institutions in the 
US (Sage, 2000), sport management scholars have yet to draw from extensive – and 
interdisciplinary – research on political economies to better understand contemporary issues of 
diversity and inclusion in sport. As demonstrated by the research presented where, 
contextualizing sport organizations not as disembodied economic entities but as political systems 




analysis is widened and issues that otherwise go unexamined are illuminated. Thus, sport 
management scholars in this area of research should continue to draw from political-economic 
analysis to better understand a variety of issues including but not limited to labor relations, racial 
exploitation, and sexism, as well as how all of these intersect within sport organizations.  
 Secondly, scholars should develop realist perspectives of sport organizational structures. 
As Weems and colleagues (2017) have noted, sport organizations do not function as naturally 
occurring, disembodied enigmas. Rather, these organizations are actively structured (by 
predominantly white men) with raced, gendered, and classed substructures (Acker, 1990, 2012; 
Feagin & Ducey, 2017; Shaw & Frisby, 2006). Therefore, one avenue for sport management 
scholars in the area of diversity, inclusion, and social justice is to move beyond discussions of 
bias and prejudice to instead interrogate the structural features of sport organizations to better 
understand the social structure of sporting oppressions. 
 Operating at the center of organizational structuration are the top managers who actively 
shape and maintain organizational norms (Acker, 2012; Stinchcombe, 1997). According to 
Feagin, “Sport is one of those key institutions created, maintained, and run by the elite white 
male” (as cited in Weems & Singer, 2017, p. 285). This statement was evident throughout the 
current study. Therefore, future research in the field of sport management should consistently 
analyze how and why sport’s white male elite and their acolytes relate to organizational 
structures, cultures, policies, and practices. Doing so could prove to be an invaluable 
contribution to the body of work on diversity, inclusion, and social justice. 
 In addition to these new avenues for sport management research, scholars should 




p. 905). In a provocative article published to Journal of Sport Management, Newman (2014) 
argued the following: 
Rather than seek to better manage gender or racial diversity… in sport, we should instead 
seek to give our teaching and research over to – to be made by – the very corporeal 
pluralities and potentialities we have too often sought to regulate or classify in the name 
of industry. (p. 612, italics in original) 
Thus, in a reconstruction of popular diversity “management” practices in sport (e.g., see Doherty 
& Chelladurai, 1999; Fink & Pastore, 1999), Weems and colleagues (2017) suggested diversity 
without management as a way to “re-imagine the ways in which we study, teach, and practice 
diversity” (p. 905). This orientation seeks to place historically marginalized groups (including 
needs, experiences, and knowledges) at the center of organizational decision-making, the 
development of policy, and organizational structure (Weems et al., 2017). For example, 
employees could be brought in for focus groups to better understand how sport organizations 
should respond to their needs. Professional athletes could be involved, and even centered, in the 
development of organizational policy. Adopting a proactive approach to accomplishing these 
tasks rather than a reactive approach (see Fink & Pastore, 1999; Cunningham, 2019) can help 
sport organizations avoid breakdowns in communication. Further application of the diversity-
without-management concept could be useful in pushing sport organizations toward being more 
diverse, inclusive, and socially just spaces. 
Sport Ownership 
 Related to the idea that sport researchers should continue to analyze sport’s elite to better 
understand how they shape organizational structure and function, sport management scholars 




individuals examined in this study are also owners of franchises in different sports, or even 
different regions altogether. This should serve as springboard to begin investigating other sport 
leagues (e.g., NBA, MLB, MLS, NHL) as both separate and connected entities. Doing so would 
yield implications for various aspects of organizational studies including resource dependence 
theory (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Pfeffer, 1987), (neo)institutional perspectives (Washington 
& Patterson, 2011; Yang & Konrad, 2011), embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996, 
1997), and organizational studies of power (Perrow, 2014). 
 As this study serves as a foundation for further analysis, scholars should also look to 
begin building theory around the concept of sport ownership. While there are similarities with 
other forms of corporate ownership, the sport industry has potentially distinctive aspects such as 
the “owning” of human beings as a form of capital. For instance, Chalip’s (2006, 2015) 
reflections on sport management as a discipline point to a variety of distinctive elements of sport 
including health, salubrious socialization, economic development, community development, and 
national pride. With the largely unacknowledged root of managerial studies and practices in the 
institution of slavery (Cooke, 2003), scholars could look to build upon critical works in sport 
such as The New Plantation: Black Athletes, College Sports, and Predominantly White NCAA 
Institutions (Hawkins, 2013) and Forty Million Dollar Slaves: The Rise, Fall, and Redemption of 
the Black Athlete (Rhoden, 2010) to further explore the (non-)distinctness of sport ownership. 
Moreover, there are significant differences for how sport team owners are taxed as opposed to 
more traditional forms of ownership (Flint & Eitzen, 1987). These differential factors present 
opportunities to build theory in the field of sport management that demonstrates a legitimate 




Critical Qualitative Research 
 Recently, a group of sport management scholars revisited the state of qualitative inquiry 
in the field of sport management (Singer et al., 2019). Although several key issues were 
discussed in the authors’ narrative approach to addressing qualitative inquiry, one theme 
emanating from their discussion was the field’s general de-emphasis on and mis-conceptions 
about the power and potential of qualitative research. Although qualitative research methods are 
gaining traction in sport management, this study shows how qualitative methods can help to 
explore complex topics while also allowing for deeper interrogation of the issues at-hand. 
Moreover, the bricolage approach to the collective case study used here presents a unique design 
to further explore creative uses in qualitative methodologies (see Hoeber & Shaw, 2017; Shaw & 
Hoeber, 2016). Therefore, the methodological implications warrant further deliberation. 
 As the field of sport management (and beyond) continues to neoliberalize (Newman, 
2014), qualitative research has an essential role to play in moving beyond the atomized – and 
often suffocating – nature of post/positivism (Denzin & Giardina, 2015). For example, Cannella 
and Lincoln (2015) argued that the saturation of neoliberal logics in research and practice could 
actually “provide prospects for critical actions that would counter and even deterritorialize 
neoliberalism” (p. 60). Thus, sport management scholars can draw from critical qualitative 
research methods to produce more emancipatory work (Weems et al., 2017), especially in 
resisting elite-white-male oligopolism. 
Resistance in and through the NFL 
 Moving forward, this research also yields implications for the study and practice of 




injustices takes place, hegemonic structures are challenged, and otherwise marginalized voices 
have the potential to be heard (see Cooper, Macaulay, & Rodriguez, 2017; Cunningham et al., 
2019; Edwards, 1969, 2016). According to Cunningham and colleagues (2019), largely missing 
from scholarly analysis of sporting resistance(s) has been “a discussion of how, why and under 
what conditions these activities take place” (p. 5). Despite the central position of the NFL of its 
ownership groups in the politics of domination there have also been various forms of resistance 
to this process, both historically and contemporaneously. Therefore, sport management 
researchers should look to further build upon the current research by including these resistances 
along with how sporting processes are subsequently impacted. 
 Some scholars have already taken steps in this direction. For example, in the edited book 
Critical Race Theory: Black Athletics Sporting Experiences in the United States, Singer and 
colleagues (2017) outlined theoretical tools (i.e., critical race theory and systemic racism theory) 
that can be used to contextualize and make sense of sporting resistance as both an active process 
and a lived experience. Seeking to disseminate critical research through other mediums, some 
scholar-activists have chosen to actively participate in sporting resistances in outlets such as the 
The Nation (e.g., Zirin, 2018, 2019) or Racism Review (e.g., Oshiro & Weems, 2019; Weems & 
Atzmon, 2018; Weems & Kusz, 2019; Weems, Oshiro, & Singer, 2017). Thus, the research 
presented here can further serve as a foundation for NFL-resistance work at both the scholarly 
and activist levels. 
CONCLUSION 
 In sum, this dissertation examined NFL ownership groups and the role(s) they play in 




plays a substantive role in the politics of elite-white-male dominance in the US and beyond. 
Accordingly, this research argues that the character and social structure of NFL ownership 
matters, and the ways in which individual owners navigate a broader political economy shape the 
structure and function of the NFL as an organization. Although some might argue that nothing 
can be done about who owns NFL franchises and how they choose to run their respective 
organizations, this dissertation explicitly rejects that sentiment. By beginning from a position of 
deeper understanding about the NFL and its ownership groups, scholars, practitioners, and 
activists are both empowered and encouraged to exercise their own agency as politicking bodies. 
In doing so, these groups can be more readily prepared to engage in a public form of liberation 
sociology. In other words, the political economy of the NFL can be reshaped to more accurately 
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